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Introduction
I care about understanding what leads people to do what they do and how we can help them to
make better decisions. With that motivation in mind, in this dissertation I mainly focus on how
individuals misperceive risks and uncertainty and how these misperceptions lead to suboptimal
decision making. And I use different tools to do that. While Chapters 1 and 4 are lab experiments,
Chapter 2 is a theoretical contribution and Chapter 3 is a field experiment. This is because I truly
believe that none of the tools alone would be enough by itself in explaining people’s behavior.
A significant part of my research is about how people make decisions about something that
they do not even know whether it is ever going happen or not, in other words ambiguity attitudes.
In 1962 Ellsberg provided a paradox with a thought experiment that showed the importance of
ambiguity attitudes as follows:
Consider two urns one of which contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls in it, and the other
contains 100 balls in red and black but we do not know in which proportion. We can call the first
urn a “risky urn” since we know the distribution of it, and the second one an “ambiguous urn”
since the distribution is unknown. We tell a person “You will receive 10 dollars if you pick a red
ball. Do you prefer to pick the ball from the first urn or the second?”. Imagine that the person
chooses the first urn, the risky urn. Then we can argue that she might believe the probability of red
balls in the ambiguous urn to be less than the probability of red balls in the risky urn which is 50%.
Next, we tell the same person “Now you will receive 10 dollars if you pick a black ball. Which urn
do you prefer?”. Imagine that she chooses the risky urn again. Does it mean that she believes the
probability of black balls in the ambiguous urn to be less than 50%? But then the probabilities of
red and black balls in the ambiguous urn do not sum to 100%. How is it possible?
With this thought experiment Ellsberg proposed that people prefer to bet on things that they have
more information about. Ever since, understanding ambiguity attitudes has been a very much
debated topic in the literature. However, some components of ambiguity attitudes were still to be
discovered, for example, attitudes for ambiguous rare events such as natural disasters. They are
rare because they do not happen often, and they are ambiguous because we do not know exactly
how often they happen. Still they are very important since the consequences of such events are
mostly much bigger than things that we deal with in our everyday lives such as being caught in
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the rain without an umbrella. How do people react to rare events? Do they ignore them? Or do
they attach so much importance to them? This is what I am searching for in Chapter 1.1 I show by
means of a lab experiment that people perceive rare events bigger than what they actually are when
those events are presented to them separately rather than all together. We can think about many
insurance packages that are sold separately rather than all-in-one insurance package that covers all
risks. When people overweigh rare events this might lead them to overinsure.
While insurance is one way of coping with negative shocks people face, another solution is to
prevent negative shocks in the first place. Sometimes there are risks that people can simply prevent.
Simple lifestyle choices such as smoking, eating well, or exercising are the causes for the majority
of preventable deaths. This means there is not enough prevention. People do not do enough. Isn’t it
puzzling that people buy health insurance but at the same time do not live a healthy life-style? One
explanation could be that people do not know that they can prevent. However, everybody knows
that smoking and obesity are objectively harmful and exercising is good for people. Moral hazard is
also not enough to explain underprevention because insurance only covers financial risks whereas
avoiding poor health has value in itself. Chapter 2 helps to solve this puzzle with an alternative and
more plausible explanation.2 I will show you that it is actually the same phenomenon that makes
people both overinsure and prevent little, namely probability weighting.
What can we do to increase prevention and reduce probability weighting? What about just
giving people more information about the risks they face? Or maybe there is a way to make them
“feel” the risks better? Chapter 3 answers these questions with an application to cybersecurity at
the organizational level.3 Cybersecurity is one of the most challenging and hot topics of today’s
world because of rapidly changing technology every single day. One of the most common threats
to cybersecurity for organisations is phishing attacks, attacks that aim at getting personal and/or
financial information electronically. It is especially a big concern for governmental organisations
such as ministries since they have so much confidential data. In Chapter 3, in collaboration with the
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs I test whether communicating information in a more effective
way or letting employees experience a simulated phishing attack help to reduce falling for phishing
attacks. Both strategies turn out to be quite effective.
Simply providing information about cybersecurity risks is enough to increase awareness and
reduce falling for phishing attacks. However, informing people about the importance of condom
usage is arguably less effective when it comes to prevention of sexually transmitted diseases or un-
wanted pregnancies. This is because people’s judgements of risk might differ in different contexts.
Chapter 4 deals with this issue and answers the question of whether sexual context has an impact
on ambiguity attitudes. There have been studies looking at sexual decision making, however, the
1co-authored with Aure´lien Baillon
2co-authored with Aure´lien Baillon, Han Bleichrodt, Johannes Jaspersen and Richard Peter
3co-authored with Aure´lien Baillon, Jeroen de Bruin, Evelien van de Veer, Bram van Dijk
3focus was on sexual decisions made in sexual moments. While decisions made in the moment are
also important, especially the decisions that need to be made in advance are the ones that provide
the grounds for prevention. For example, one cannot decide whether to use a condom in the mo-
ment without having bought that condom in the first place. Therefore, not only how people make
decisions when they are sexually aroused is important but also whether being in a situation that
has sexual associations alter decisions is. I show that sexual context has an impact on how people
perceive likelihoods.
To sum up, my research shows that the majority of people are not as rational as they are as-
sumed to be against a risk they face, however, their behavior is not random either. People have
imperfect understanding of risks and likelihoods but those imperfections are systematic. The stud-
ies in this PhD dissertation help to understand those systematic misperceptions: what they are,
what mechanisms generate them, how they affect behavior and what can be done to help people
make better decisions.
Chapter 1
Zooming in on Ambiguity Attitudes∗
Joint with
Aure´lien Baillon
1.1. Introduction
Ambiguous rare events are pervasive in various fields of economics. Ambiguous rare events related
to losses are events against which people may wish to insure. Policies for preventing or coping with
environmental catastrophes also concern ambiguous rare events. Neglect of rare events can explain
recent financial crises, as argued by Taleb (2007) in his book The Black Swan. An example of a
rare event in the gain domain is to find a so-called ‘unicorn’, a start-up whose value exceeds one
billion dollars. The occurrence of bubbles in the evaluation of high-tech start-ups, such the ‘dot-
com bubble’ at the end of the 90s or the more recent Silicon Valley tech bubble, can be a sign that
these rare events are overweighted by investors.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observed that rare events are typically either completely ne-
glected or overweighted. For decision-making under risk, the common view in the literature is that
low-probability events are overweighted (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Gonzalez and Wu,
1999). However, the picture is not so clear when we consider other decision paradigms. Recent
research in psychology has shown that if unlikely events are not described but rather experienced
by agents, such events tend to be partially neglected or underweighted (see, for instance, Barron
and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig and Erev, 2009). Regarding ambiguity, Ellsberg
noted in his thesis (republished in 2011) that the common finding of ambiguity aversion might be
due to the focus on moderate-likelihood events and gains and that the results might be reversed if
unlikely events were to be considered. Several papers have confirmed this conjecture for events
with likelihoods in the range of 10 to 30% (e.g., Ert and Trautmann, 2014; Baillon and Bleichrodt,
2015; Dimmock et al., 2015), but Ert and Trautmann (2014) also showed that experiencing unlikely
ambiguous events made them less attractive.
∗Published as “ Baillon, A. and A. Emirmahmutoglu (2018). Zooming in on ambiguity attitudes. International
Economic Review, 59(4), 2107-2131.”
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In this paper, we zoom in on very unlikely events1 in an Ellsberg-like experiment. Despite
the numerous studies on ambiguity attitudes conducted in recent decades (see Trautmann and Van
De Kuilen, 2015, for a survey), rare events have been virtually ignored to date because of three
major challenges. The first challenge is to provide sufficiently high incentives to consider such
rare events.2 In our experiment, subjects could either lose an initial endowment of e300 (loss
frame) or win an equal amount (gain frame). The second challenge lies in identifying ambigu-
ity attitudes generated on top of risk attitudes when moving from decision-making under risk to
decision-making under uncertainty. We use matching probabilities to address this issue. The
matching probability for an event E is the objective probability p that makes a decision-maker
indifferent between receiving a nonzero outcome e300 with probability p and receiving e300 if
event E occurs. Dimmock et al. (2015) formally showed that matching probabilities can directly
capture ambiguity attitudes without requiring correction for utility or probability weighting. We
generalize their result and develop an approach that is valid for all ambiguity models and all deci-
sion models under risk. The third challenge is related to controlling for people’s unknown beliefs.
A decision-maker may truly believe that an event is impossible, and we should not misinterpret
such behavior as neglecting a rare event. Therefore, we do not use arbitrary benchmarks to assess
overweighting or ignorance of very unlikely events. Instead, we compare matching probabilities
only with themselves and study their internal consistency, as proposed by Baillon et al. (2018). We
do this through the use of additivity measures. Intuitively, if an unlikely event is neither ignored
nor overweighted, it should be assigned the same subjective value (matching probability) either
in isolation or as part of a larger event. Hence, matching probabilities should be additive under
ambiguity neutrality. If unlikely events are weighted more strongly in isolation (overweighting),
then the matching probabilities will be said to be subadditive. Neglecting or underweighting would
result in the opposite violation of additivity (superadditivity).3
Below, we begin by defining the theoretical framework and highlighting its advantages (sec-
tion 2). We show that our approach is as general as possible and does not rely on any strong
assumptions. After describing the experiment (section 3), we pursue our minimal-assumption ap-
proach for empirical analysis as well (section 4). We first use non-parametric tests to examine
whether additivity is violated and, if so, whether it is violated differently in the gain frame and
in the loss frame. Our analysis reveals that very unlikely events were not ignored but rather were
overweighted overall, and more so in the loss frame. Second, to study heterogeneity of behavior,
1Throughout the paper, we use the terms “very unlikely event” and “rare event” interchangeably
2Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) simply avoided this problem by conducting a hypothetical survey.
3Thus far, the only study to address the first challenge (incentives) of which we are aware was conducted by
Schade et al. (2012). However, they did not address the two other challenges and could not draw clear conclusions
about ambiguity attitudes.
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we use latent profile analysis with completely free parameters. This approach allows us to extract
several behavioral profiles from the data without ex ante assumptions regarding what these profiles
should be. Simultaneously, subjects are classified in accordance with these profiles. One of these
profiles is close to ambiguity neutrality and represents approximately one third of the subjects. The
other profiles consist of mild and extreme deviations from ambiguity neutrality, all in the sense of
the overweighting of rare events. Finally, we discuss the interpretation and possible consequences
of our results (section 5). Agents who assign greater weight to events in isolation than combined
might be exploited in the form of money pumping, for instance, by splitting an insurance contract
into subcontracts. The conclusion is presented in section 6.
1.2. Theoretical Framework
1.2.1. Notation and matching probabilities
The state space is finite and is denoted by S. It contains all possible states of nature. Only one
state is realized, but it is unknown which one. Subsets of S are called events, and each event
is denoted by E. The complementary event to E is denoted by EC . The possible outcomes
are monetary amounts from the set {-300, 0, 300}. Bets assign a nonzero outcome to an event
and a zero outcome to the complement of that event. An uncertain bet is denoted by xE0, with
x ∈ {−300, 300}, and concerns an event E whose probability is uncertain. It yields ex if the true
state belongs to E and yields nothing otherwise (if event EC is realized). A risky bet is denoted by
xp0, with x ∈ {−300, 300} and p ∈ [0, 1]. It pays an amount ex with an objective probability of
p and pays nothing with an objective probability of (1− p).
Preferences over bets are denoted by %. We assume that the decision-makers have preferences
over all possible combinations of uncertain and risky bets, for all E ⊂ S, x ∈ {−300, 300}, and
p ∈ [0, 1]. We also assume that the decision-makers’ preferences exhibit monotonicity, such that
they prefer more to less. Strict preference () and indifference (∼) are defined as usual.
When a decision-maker is indifferent between two bets such that
xE0 ∼ xp0, (1)
we call p a matching probability of event E and denote it by ms(E) = p, where the superscript
s ∈ {+,−} denotes the sign of x. Hence, the matching probability for event E and sign s is the
objective probability p that makes a decision-maker indifferent between an uncertain bet on E and
a risky bet that pays out the same amount x with probability p. We require minimal rationality
of the decision-makers and assume that they satisfy ms(∅) = 0 and ms(S) = 1 for all s. The
function ms is increasing if E ⊂ F implies ms(E) ≤ ms(F ). It is additive if, for all E and F
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such that E ∩ F = ∅, ms(E ∪ F ) = ms(E) +ms(F ).
1.2.2. Using ambiguity neutrality as a benchmark
Following Ellsberg (1961), we say that an agent is ambiguity averse (ambiguity seeking) if, for
all E, there exists a p such that xE0 ≺ ()xp0 and xEC0 ≺ ()x1−p0. In a typical Ellsberg
experiment, E corresponds to drawing a red ball from an opaque urn containing red and black
balls in unknown proportion. The matching probability for event E can then be compared against
a probability of 50% to characterize the decision-maker’s ambiguity attitude, under the assumption
that the decision-maker does not have any reason to believe that red is more likely than black. A
more advanced approach consists of also measuring the matching probability of EC (drawing a
black ball) and then testing whether the sum of the matching probabilities is 1. Such an approach
does not rely on any assumption regarding the decision-maker’s beliefs. Below, we generalize this
approach.
A decision-maker satisfying the subjective expected utility model (Savage, 1954) evaluates
the uncertain bet xE0 as P (E)U(x), where U(x) is the utility function and P (E) is the additive
subjective probability of E. Probabilistic sophistication relaxes the functional form assumption of
subjective expected utility and holds when a probability measure P (.) exists such that the decision-
maker evaluates the uncertain bet xE0 as V (xP (E)0), where V (.) represents the decision-maker’s
preference over risky bets. Hence, under probabilistic sophistication, an individual is indifferent
between xE0 and xP (E)0, and therefore, ms(E) = P (E). In other words, if probabilistic so-
phistication holds, the matching probabilities are sign-independent and additive. Following the
ambiguity literature, we define ambiguity neutrality as probabilistic sophistication.4 If V is the
expected utility functional, then ambiguity neutrality is equivalent to subjective expected utility.
A wide range of ambiguity models assumes expected utility under risk, most notably Schmei-
dler’s (1989) Choquet expected utility, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility,
Klibanoff et al.’s (2005) smooth ambiguity model, Maccheroni et al.’s (2006) variational prefer-
ences, Siniscalchi’s (2009) vector expected utility, and Cerreia-Vioglio et al.’s (2011) uncertainty-
averse preferences. Observation 1 directly follows from the definition of ambiguity neutrality, even
if V is not the expected utility functional.
Observation 1 Assume any ambiguity model and any decision model under risk V . Ambiguity
neutrality holds if and only ifm+ andm− are additive andm+ = m−.
Our approach will therefore consist of testing whether m+ and m− are additive and/or differ.
This approach has four main advantages:
4Epstein (1999) proposed the adoption of this definition in a context in which no objective probabilities are avail-
able.
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Isolation of ambiguity attitudes Matching probabilities isolate ambiguity attitudes from risk at-
titudes, as shown by Dimmock et al. (2015). They directly capture what uncertainty adds to
risk (to V ), which is a commonly accepted definition of ambiguity.
No restrictions regarding ambiguity models Our approach is not restricted to any specific am-
biguity model. Deviations from probabilistic sophistication constitute evidence of ambiguity
attitudes in all ambiguity models, and our approach is as general as possible.5
No restrictions regarding risk V can be any decision model under risk. It need not be expected
utility nor prospect theory, as in Dimmock et al. (2015).
No assumptions regarding beliefs Additivity properties can be tested regardless of people’s be-
liefs. Our approach does not rely on any assumptions regarding what people (should) believe.
Note that decision-makers may be neither ambiguity averse nor ambiguity seeking (i.e., may
have matching probabilities of complementary events that sum to 1) while still deviating from
ambiguity neutrality. This can occur, for instance, if they overweight unlikely events to the same
extent that they underweight very likely events. This is why it is important to study the various
ways in which decision-makers may deviate from neutrality. We do so by considering three indices
of additivity, similar to those of Kilka and Weber (2001) and Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015). These
indices represent three different preference conditions, namely, binary complementarity, lower
additivity and upper additivity, and describe different patterns of ambiguity attitudes. Ambiguity
neutrality predicts that all indices should be zero and, therefore, should also be the same for gains as
for losses. The binary complementarity index captures ambiguity aversion in the sense of Ellsberg,
that is, a general dislike for ambiguity regarding both events and their complements. The upper
and lower additivity indices focus on deviations from ambiguity neutrality for very unlikely events
and for very likely events, respectively.
1.2.3. Binary Complementarity
The first index that we use directly follows from the idea of Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox as presented
above and simply checks whether the matching probabilities of two complementary events sum to
1. Accordingly, our binary complementarity index (BC index) measures the distance from unity of
the sum of the matching probabilities of an event and its complementary event as follows:
BCs(E) = 1−ms(E)−ms(EC). (2)
5Dimmock et al.’s (2015) was restricted to ambiguity models in which a subjective probability measure exists.
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We say that binary complementarity holds if BCs(E) = 0. BCs(E) > 0 indicates ambiguity aver-
sion for gains and ambiguity seeking for losses. Symmetrically, BCs(E) < 0 indicates ambiguity
seeking for gains and ambiguity aversion for losses.
The remaining two indices are based on preference conditions introduced by Tversky and
Wakker (1995).
1.2.4. Lower Additivity
Consider two disjoint events E,F ⊂ S. Lower additivity holds if an event has the same influence
when added to the empty event and when added to a non-empty event. In terms of preference
conditions, under the assumption that we observe the following preferences (where equation (3) is
trivial)
x∅0 ∼ x00 (3)
and xE0 ∼ xp0, (4)
lower additivity means that
if xF0 ∼ xq0 (5)
then xE∪F0 ∼ xp+q0 (6)
whenever E ∪F is bounded away from S.6 Hence, lower additivity holds if a change from ∅ to E
has the same impact on the matching probability as a change from F to E ∪F . In other words, the
difference in matching probability between (3) and (4) should be equal to the difference between
(5) and (6), i.e., ms(E) − ms(∅) = p = ms(E ∪ F ) − ms(F ) with ms(∅) = 0. This equality
gives rise to the lower additivity index (LA index):
LAs(E,F ) = ms(E) +ms(F )−ms(E ∪ F ). (7)
Note that the LA index is commutative in its arguments E and F , i.e., LAs(E,F ) = LAs(F,E).
Lower additivity holds if LAs(E,F ) = 0, lower subadditivity holds if LAs(E,F ) > 0, and lower
superadditivity holds if LAs(E,F ) < 0.
1.2.5. Upper Additivity
The third and last index is the symmetric of the LA index, measuring the effect of removing an
event from the universal event instead of adding an event to the empty event. Upper additivity
6See Wakker (2010), section 10.4.2, for a formal definition.
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holds if the impact of removing an event from the universal event is the same as that of removing it
from a non-universal event. If a decision-maker exhibits the following preferences (where equation
(8) is trivial)
xS0 ∼ x10 (8)
and xS−E0 ∼ x1−p0, (9)
then upper additivity means that
if xE∪F0 ∼ xp+q0 (10)
then xF0 ∼ xq0 (11)
whenever F is bounded away from ∅. Hence, upper additivity holds if a change from S to S − E
has the same impact on the matching probability as a change from E ∪ F to F , i.e., ms(S) −
ms(S − E) = p = ms(E ∪ F ) −ms(F ) with ms(S) = 1. We define the upper additivity index
(UA index) as
UAs(E,F ) = [1−ms(S − E)]− [ms(E ∪ F )−ms(F )], (12)
where upper additivity is satisfied whenUAs(E,F ) = 0. Upper subadditivity holds ifUAs(E,F ) >
0, and upper superadditivity holds if UAs(E,F ) < 0. Note that in contrast to the LA index, the
UA index is not commutative.
1.3. Method
In this section, we outline the experiment. Further details about the experiment are given in Ap-
pendix 1.A.
1.3.1. Subjects and procedure
Students from a Dutch university7 participated in the experiment. The subjects were recruited from
among students who had expressed a desire to be invited to participate in experiments. In total,
N = 99 subjects consisting of 37 female and 62 male subjects with a median age of 23 participated
in the experiment. The majority of the subjects were studying economics.8 A maximum of two
7All students were taking courses at Erasmus University Rotterdam; however, due to joint programs, some were
officially registered at the University of Amsterdam or the Free University of Amsterdam.
8The subjects were recruited by sending e-mail invitations to potential participants chosen randomly from a pool
of students who had registered via a platform to participate in experiments conducted at Erasmus University. At this
university, the two largest faculties are the business school and the school of economics. In our experiment, 84% of the
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subjects participated in each session of the experiment. The sessions were held in a room with
two cubicles (formed by panels placed on tables) to prevent communication between the subjects.
The subjects took approximately 35 minutes to read the instructions, complete the experiment, and
receive payment. Two between-subject treatments were applied: the “gain frame” and the “loss
frame”. The treatments were assigned randomly to the sessions.
1.3.2. Stimuli
The experiment was a variant of the original Ellsberg experiment. Ambiguity was created by means
of a bag that contained multiple tickets marked with numbers ranging from 1 to 200. Neither the
number of tickets in the bag nor the selection of numbers used to mark the tickets was known to
the subjects. A ticket would be drawn from the bag, and the number on the ticket would determine
the subjects’ payment. Hence, the state space was S = {1, · · · , 200}. We elicited the matching
probabilities of various events from S.
To determine these events, the subjects were asked to assign different numbers to 6 symbols:
4, 9, , #, ♦, and ‡. Using these symbols, we created the events described in Table 1. In
Set A, the specified events were very unlikely to occur, whereas they were very likely to occur
in Set B. We elicited the matching probabilities for all events described in Table 1. In the gain
frame (gain treatment), each of the specified events would lead to a e300 payoff. In the loss frame
(loss treatment), these same events would each lead to the loss of a e300 endowment that the
subjects initially received. The order of elicitation of the matching probabilities was randomized
and different for each subject.9
We used choice lists to elicit the matching probabilities. Figure 1 shows an example of the
choice list related to the event {9,} in Set A for the gain treatment. The ranges of probabilities
in the choice lists for the risky bets (Option 2) were kept constant within each set of questions,
but they varied between the sets. The probabilities ranged from 0% to 5.5% in Set A and from
94.5% to 100% in Set B. Therefore, a subject whose matching probabilities lay outside of these
ranges constituted censored observations. The matching probability of each uncertain event was
calculated by taking the midpoint between the highest (lowest) p such that xE0  xp0 and the
lowest (highest) p such that xE0 ≺ xp0 for gains (losses).
subjects were studying “Economics”, “Economics and Business Economics” or “Economics and Law”, whereas 16%
were studying “Management”, “Law”, “Psychology”, “Sociology”, or other disciplines. Economics students may be
expected to behave more in line with traditional economic models (Marwell and Ames, 1981; Carter and Irons, 1991);
in our case, this would suggest that they would be likely to be closer to ambiguity neutrality.
9In Appendix 1.A, we describe an additional set of questions, Set C, concerning events of moderate likelihood.
Note that Set C was never a crucial component of the experiment because it did not concern rare events. As we show
in the appendix, one of the four events in Set C was often misunderstood by the subjects; consequently, we decided to
disregard Set C as a whole.
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Table 1: Events and their descriptions
Set Event Description: the ticket drawn from the bag is marked with...
A
{4} ...the number chosen by the subject for4.
{9,} ...the number chosen by the subject for9 or .
{#,♦, ‡} ...the number chosen by the subject for #,♦ or ‡.
{4,#,♦, ‡} ...the number chosen by the subject for4,#,♦ or ‡.
{9,,#,♦, ‡} ...the number chosen by the subject for9,,#,♦ or ‡.
{4,9,,#,♦, ‡} ...the number chosen by the subject for4,9,,#,♦ or ‡.
B
{4}C ...any number between 1 and 200 except for the number chosen by
the subject for4.
{9,}C ...any number between 1 and 200 except for the numbers chosen by
the subject for9 and .
{#,♦, ‡}C ...any number between 1 and 200 except for the numbers chosen by
the subject for #,♦ and ‡.
{4,#,♦, ‡}C ...any number between 1 and 200 except for the numbers chosen by
the subject for4,#,♦ and ‡.
{9,,#,♦, ‡}C ...any number between 1 and 200 except for the numbers chosen by
the subject for9,,#,♦ and ‡.
{4,9,,#,♦, ‡}C ...any number between 1 and 200 except for the numbers chosen by
the subject for4,9,,#,♦ and ‡.
1.3.3. Incentives
Subjects received a e5 show-up fee. In addition, they had the chance to play one of their choices
for real. The subjects in the gain treatment were each physically shown the e300 prize and were
told that they could both win it, but the money (e600 in total) remained on the experimenter’s desk.
Given that we could not cause the subjects to lose e300 of their own money, we gave e300 to each
subject in the loss treatment before they started reading the instructions. We placed the money on
their desks and told them that it was theirs. All subjects signed a consent form, but the consent
form for the loss treatment also asked the subjects to acknowledge that they were given e300.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the subjects in the loss treatment considered only the final outcome
(e0 or e300). Strictly speaking, the loss treatment was a loss-frame treatment. The fact that we
displayed cash money was also the reason why we conducted each session with a maximum of two
subjects. This way, we did not need to have more than e600 on hand at a time.
Because the amount to be gained or lost was high, it was important that the subjects did not
believe that the experimenters could influence the outcome. Such mistrust could develop if the
experimenters were to decide which specific number(s) had to be drawn from the bag to determine
the outcomes of the uncertain bets. For example, a subject in the gain treatment might have be-
lieved that the specific numbers chosen by the experimenters would never be in the bag and that it
would therefore be impossible to win. We prevented such mistrust in two ways. First, the bag was
prepared before the subjects entered the room and thus before the subjects had selected their own
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Figure 1: Sample question for the event {9,} in the gain treatment
numbers to be drawn from the bag to determine the outcomes of the uncertain bets. Second, we
asked the subjects to make a decision both for a given event (Set A) and for the complement of the
same event (Set B), and we explicitly stated this in the instructions. Risky bets were implemented
with dice.
At the beginning of the experiment, the subjects drew envelopes containing codes that would
be opened at the end of the experiment and would determine which choice would be played for
real. In the gain treatment, some envelopes would result in no choice being played at all; in the
loss treatment, some envelopes would result in a guaranteed loss of the initial endowment. The
exact list of envelopes is given in Appendix 1.A. The purpose of allowing the subjects to draw an
envelope first and making them aware that only one choice would ultimately be played for real was
to convince them to consider each choice as if it were the choice in the envelope (Johnson et al.,
2014). The average payment was e14, but with a highly skewed distribution (three subjects left
with e305).
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1.3.4. Analysis
The analysis was conducted on 1114 observations from the 99 subjects (49 and 50 subjects each in
the gain and loss treatments, respectively).10
Since we had censored observations, we chose to use non-parametric tests in our analysis. The
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was used to test whether the indices were significantly different from
zero. The differences in indices between the treatments were tested using the Mann-Whitney U
test. These analyses were conducted separately for each event.
To study the heterogeneity of behavior, we performed a latent profile analysis (LPA).11 By
identifying shared characteristics in the subjects’ indices, the LPA produced different endogenous
groups (called profiles) and assigned a probability of being in each group to each subject. Hence,
via the LPA, we could answer both the questions of what proportion of the subjects deviated from
ambiguity neutrality and by how much. We implemented the LPA by means of the expectation
maximization (EM) algorithm.12 The EM algorithm has the advantages of simplicity, guaranteed
convergence, and numerical stability. We conducted the LPA separately for the LA and UA indices.
In our estimation procedure, we assumed only that the indices had multivariate normal distribu-
tion. For each profile, we estimated the mean of each index and the covariance matrix. We did
not impose any restrictions on the parameter values. Therefore, we did not force the profiles to
represent certain characteristics but rather let the data speak for themselves.
1.4. Results
In what follows, we multiply the matching probabilities by 100 and therefore report the results as
percentages.
1.4.1. Aggregate Results
Figure 2 displays the matching probabilities for all events in Table 1. An ambiguity-neutral sub-
ject who believes all numbers between 1 and 200 have an equal chance of being drawn from the
bag would have matching probabilities of 0.5%, 1%, ..., 3% in Panel a and 99.5%, 99%, ..., 97% in
Panel b. Figure 2 shows that a vast majority of the subjects had matching probabilities higher than
10Of the 1188 total observations, 74 were excluded from the analysis. See Appendix 1.A for details on the exclusion
criteria.
11LPA is also known as “finite mixture modeling”
12We applied the EM algorithm with 1000 iterations. The starting values of the profile means and covariances were
obtained from three random subsamples in each iteration. The results of the iteration with the highest log-likelihood
value were taken to be optimal.
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(a) very unlikely events (b) very likely events
Numbers are reported as percentages.
Every boxplot has lines at Q1, the median, and Q3. The adjacent lines show the most extreme values within 1.5 times
the IQR of the nearer quartile.
Figure 2: Median matching probabilities
these thresholds in Panel a and lower in Panel b. These findings are consistent with the overweight-
ing of rare events. However, this interpretation relies on the assumption that the subjects believed
that all numbers were equally likely to be drawn from the bag. This assumption might be violated
for subjects who chose numbers for the symbols 4, 9, , #, ♦, and ‡ that they expected to be
more likely (or less likely) to be drawn. To avoid any assumptions regarding the subjects’ beliefs,
we studied the additivity indices defined in Section 2.
Binary Complementarity:
The median of the sum of the matching probabilities of an event and its complementary event
was always very close to 100%, resulting in BC indices equal to 0 in most cases (see the upper
part of Table 2). The BC indices differed from 0 in only four of the twelve cases (once in the
gain treatment and three times in the loss treatment). In all these cases, the difference was in the
direction consistent with ambiguity aversion. The significance tests for the differences between
the two treatments show that the BC indices in the loss treatment were significantly or marginally
lower than those in the gain treatment in four of the six indices. This pattern is also consistent with
ambiguity aversion, which predicts higher BC indices in the gain frame than in the loss frame.14
13Since matching probabilities for all events were not available for all subjects (see Appendix 1.A - Matching
probabilities), not all of the indices could be calculated for all subjects. This situation resulted in different sample
sizes for each test.
14This is because ambiguity aversion predicts BC+ > 0 and 0 > BC−.
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Table 2: Median analysis
Gain Loss Comparison
Median z score N Median z score N Conclusion z score
BC({4}) 0.00 1.08 42 0.00 -1.22 45 G>L + 1.63
BC({9,}) 0.00 + 1.70 44 0.00 0.00 42 1.06
BC({#,♦, ‡}) 0.00 0.94 44 -0.10∗ -2.42 46 G>L ∗ 2.11
BC({4,#,♦, ‡}) 0.00 0.98 44 0.00 -0.78 46 1.27
BC({9,,#,♦, ‡}) 0.00 0.76 45 -0.10 ∗ -2.22 47 G>L ∗ 1.98
BC({4,9,,#,♦, ‡}) 0.00 1.62 46 -0.10 ∗ -2.53 46 G>L ∗∗ 2.73
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) 0.15 ∗∗ 2.97 44 0.75 ∗∗∗ 4.30 44 G<L ∗ -1.76
LA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}) 0.45 ∗∗∗ 3.55 44 0.95 ∗∗∗ 4.73 46 G<L ∗ -1.65
LA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}) 0.45 ∗∗ 2.94 45 0.80 ∗∗∗ 3.90 42 -1.08
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 0.70 ∗∗∗ 3.60 40 0.70 ∗∗∗ 3.96 46 0.02
UA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C) 0.75 ∗∗∗ 3.97 42 1.05 ∗∗∗ 5.28 45 -0.79
UA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 1.55 ∗∗∗ 4.16 41 0.65 ∗∗∗ 4.41 46 1.03
N represents the number of subjects in a particular test13
Numbers are reported as percentages
Stars indicate the significance levels of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (“Gain” and “Loss” columns) and the
Mann-Whitney U test for the BC (LA or UA) distribution for gains being higher (lower) than that for losses
(“Comparison” column)
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Lower additivity:
Lower additivity was defined as the difference in impact between adding a rare event to the empty
event and adding the same rare event to a non-empty event. Table 2 shows that the median lower
additivity indices were positive in all cases for both the gain frame and the loss frame. Hence,
lower subadditivity held. Most subjects assigned higher weights to rare events when they were
described in isolation than when they were part of larger events. There was also evidence that the
overweighting of rare events was stronger in the loss frame than in the gain frame.
Upper additivity:
After analyzing lower additivity, we examined upper additivity by looking at the difference in im-
pact between removing a rare event from the universal event and removing it from a non-universal
event. The upper additivity indices were positive in all cases for both treatments (see the bottom
of Table 2), indicating upper subadditivity and, thus, the overweighting of rare events that were re-
moved from the universal event. Equivalently, events that were almost certain were underweighted.
The between-treatment comparison revealed no significant difference.
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1.4.2. Latent Profile Analysis
The aggregate analysis highlighted the occurrence of strong and consistent overweighting of rare
events. To further understand this behavior, we established behavioral profiles via LPA. As a
preparatory step, we generated kernel density plots for the LA and UA indices (Figure 3). Such
plots can visualize the heterogeneity of behavior and whether this heterogeneity arises from differ-
ent groups of subjects.
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
Kernel density plot of LA indices
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
LA−({4}, {#,♦, ‡})
LA−({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡})
LA−({9,}, {#,♦, ‡})
LA+({4}, {#,♦, ‡})
LA+({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡})
LA+({9,}, {#,♦, ‡})
1
1
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
0.
35
Kernel density plot of UA indices
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
UA−({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C)
UA−({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C)
UA−({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C)
UA+({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C)
UA+({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C)
UA+({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C)
1
1
Figure 3: Kernel density plots
Examination of the kernel density plots revealed that the LA and UA indices were not homoge-
neous. Although there was a clear accumulation around a value of zero for all indices, there were
also at least two other accumulations, a small one around two for several indices and a larger one
around five for most indices. To account for these three accumulations, we performed LPA using
the EM algorithm for three profiles with no restrictions on the class parameters (the means and
covariances of the indices for each profile). It is possible that there were more than three profiles;
however, we preferred this parsimonious specification because the consideration of each additional
class would necessitate the estimation of ten more parameters. The LPA was performed indepen-
dently for the LA and UA indices, over the set of subjects for whom we could calculate all indices
in each case.15
15The numbers of subjects with complete observations for the LA and UA indices were 86 and 81, respectively.
16The Hessian matrix was calculated using the numDeriv package in R with the options d=.1 and r=4.
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Table 3: Latent profile analysis
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) LA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}) LA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡})
Profile p S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
1 51.64%∗∗∗ 0.10 0.24+ 0.14 0.23∗ 0.11 0.31∗ 0.15
2 39.06%∗∗∗ 0.09 1.56∗∗∗ 0.43 1.87∗∗∗ 0.49 1.46∗∗∗ 0.39
3 9.30%∗∗∗ 0.03 5.53∗∗∗ 0.00 5.44∗∗∗ 0.00 5.38∗∗∗ 0.03
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) UA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C) UA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C)
Profile p S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
1 42.89%∗∗∗ 0.08 0.42∗∗∗ 0.11 0.22+ 0.12 0.30∗∗ 0.10
2 47.24%∗∗∗ 0.04 1.16∗∗ 0.35 2.09∗∗∗ 0.30 2.23∗∗∗ 0.42
3 9.87% 0.08 5.27∗∗∗ 0.02 4.06∗∗∗ 0.01 5.24∗∗∗ 0.00
Standard errors were obtained from the Hessian matrix calculated at the estimated parameter values16
Numbers are reported as percentages
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3 presents the LPA results. They are consistent with our expectations from the kernel den-
sity plots. For Profile 1, all indices have means near zero with very small variances (the covariance
matrices can be found in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix 1.B). Although the means are (marginally)
significantly different from 0, they are still very small, and Profile 1 is very close to ambiguity
neutrality. For Profile 2, the indices have means near 2 with high variances, and for Profile 3, the
means are near 5. The profiles for the LA and UA indices are very similar despite having been
estimated independently. All profiles confirm the absence of upper or lower superadditivity. The
subjects either overweighted rare events or were ambiguity neutral; there was no group of subjects
who neglected rare events. The LPA assigned to each subject a probability of belonging to each
group. Except in a few cases, each subject was assigned to one of the profiles with near certainty.
Half of our sample was assigned to Profile 1 for LA and 43% for UA, indicating that many subjects
were very close to ambiguity neutrality. Only approximately 10% of the subjects were assigned to
Profile 3 (extreme overweighting).
Although the above analysis was conducted only for the subjects for whom complete observa-
tions were available regarding the indices, it was also possible to calculate the profile membership
probabilities for subjects for whom at least one index value was available. Therefore, using the es-
timated profile means and covariances shown in Table 3, we calculated the probabilities for those
subjects as well and included them in our analysis presented below. In this way, we could make
use of all of the information available from the data.17
From the classification of the subjects into profiles, we could study whether subjects given one
17This approach resulted in the consideration of 92 and 91 subjects in the LA and UA analyses, respectively, 90 of
whom were considered in both analyses.
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Figure 4: Cross-tabulation of LA and UA categorizations
treatment were more likely to be assigned to a specific profile than subjects given the other treat-
ment. For the LA index, the subjects given the loss treatment had probabilities of 48%, 37% and
15% of being assigned to Profiles 1, 2, and 3, respectively, whereas the corresponding probabilities
were 52%, 44% and 4% for the subjects given the gain treatment. Hence, although the proportion
of Profile 1 subjects was the same for both treatments, the subjects given the loss treatment more
often belonged to Profile 3 (extreme overweighting) than did the subjects given the gain treatment.
For the UA index, the probabilities of belonging to each profile were 47%, 46% and 7% for the
loss treatment and 35%, 51% and 14% for the gain treatment. Hence, the subjects tended to show
upper subadditivity more often in the gain treatment than in the loss treatment.
Finally, each subject was categorized into one of the three profiles for the LA and UA indices
independently. We were also interested in whether a subject who was categorized as showing lower
additivity (subadditivity) would also be categorized as showing upper additivity (subadditivity).
Figure 4 presents the proportions of the subjects assigned to the different combinations of profiles
for LA and UA. The majority of the subjects were assigned to the same profile for LA as for
UA.18 Almost no one was categorized as Profile 1 (ambiguity neutrality) for LA and Profile 3
(extreme overweighting) for UA or vice versa. Overall, approximately one third of the subjects
18All subjects were assigned to the profile for which they had a p > 50%. There were no subjects whose profile
probabilities were below 50% for all profiles. Only 14 subjects exhibited a maximum p value below 70% for either
the LA or UA profile.
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were classified as Profile 1 for both LA and UA, meaning that they were consistently close to
ambiguity neutrality. The fact that a substantial proportion of the subjects were ambiguity neutral
is not surprising with regard to the findings of Ahn et al. (2014), who did not reject ambiguity
neutrality for the majority of subjects.
1.5. Discussion
Our analysis revealed only weak ambiguity aversion as measured by the BC index. However, the
LA and UA indices were significantly positive, leading to the rejection of the hypothesis of ambi-
guity neutrality and consistent with the overweighting of rare events. Three interpretations of such
overweighting can be found in the literature. In the first, ambiguity attitudes are regarded as depen-
dent on likelihood and outcomes (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1990). This leads to a four-fold pattern
of ambiguity attitudes: ambiguity-seeking attitudes for very unlikely gains and very likely losses
and ambiguity-averse attitudes for very likely gains and very unlikely losses (Trautmann and Van
De Kuilen, 2015). The second interpretation explains the overweighting of unlikely events (and
the equivalent underweighting of very likely events) as a consequence of likelihood insensitivity
(Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Wakker, 2010). According to this interpretation, ambiguity decreases
people’s ability to discriminate between likelihood levels. In the extreme case, some people might
assign the same weight to all events, hence overweighting rare events and underweighting very
likely ones.
The third interpretation differentiates between ambiguity perception and ambiguity aversion, as
in one of the best-known ambiguity models, the alpha-maxmin model (Ghirardato et al., 2004). In
that model, ambiguity perception is represented by a set of priors. The decision-maker maximizes
a linear combination of the best and worst expected utilities that can be obtained over this set
of priors. The weight assigned to the worst case is denoted by alpha. Ambiguity aversion is then
defined as an alpha value larger than 0.5. Baillon and Bleichrodt (2015) showed how the perception
of ambiguity (a set of priors that is not a singleton) can lead to the overweighting of rare events
for any alpha value other than 0 or 1. Hence, our results are compatible with the alpha-maxmin
model.19 Each profile identified in the LPA can then be interpreted as corresponding to a different
degree of perceived ambiguity (almost none, mild, and extreme).
The experiment was conducted using choice lists because this approach has the advantage
of making the incentive system easier to explain to the participants. As seen in Figure 1, the
probability that would be chosen by an ambiguity-neutral person with uniform beliefs was more
salient because of the smaller steps around it. This ensured both higher precision in this probability
region and more conservative results. However, systematically switching from the ambiguous
19This compatibility requires a median alpha value that is very slightly above 0.5 to account for the BC results.
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prospects to the risky prospects in the middle of the choice list (i.e., exhibiting a middle bias) tends
to result in positive LA and UA indices and a zero BC index. Although there was no obvious
evidence for a middle bias in the raw data, we ran an online experiment to check the robustness
of our elicitation method. In this robustness check, we focused on our weakest results from the
gain treatment (LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) and UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C), which had the lowest medians)
and tested whether they could be replicated with a method immune to middle bias. We used a
bisection method, in which subjects are presented with one choice after another and therefore
cannot be influenced by any middle bias. The methodological details of the robustness check
are described in Appendix 1.C. We obtained slightly lower medians for LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) and
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) (0.05 and 0.55 instead of 0.15 and 0.75), with the former deviation being
marginally significant20 and the latter being significant at p < 0.001. We again obtained stronger
deviations from 0 for the UA index than for the LA index.
Using random incentives in an ambiguity experiment (i.e., paying out for at most one choice
among many choices with a given probability) is a common practice in the literature. Concretely, it
means offering a compound lottery, with the first stage being the objective probability that a choice
is played for real at all and the second stage being the chosen option, possibly an ambiguous bet.
As noted by several authors (e.g., Oechssler and Roomets, 2014; Bade, 2015), if subjects men-
tally reverse the order of the compound lottery, perceiving first the ambiguous events and then the
lottery, they may act as if they are ambiguity neutral even if they are not, leading to an overestima-
tion of ambiguity neutrality. By contrast, Baillon et al. (2015) showed that perceiving the original
order (objective probability followed by ambiguity) does not imply ambiguity neutrality. In our
experiment, we made clear that the random incentives were implemented before the uncertainty
was resolved, and even before the subjects made their choices, by using envelopes that the subjects
drew at the beginning of the experiment to determine which choice would be played for real, as
described in Section 3.3.
The results regarding the BC index show only limited support for ambiguity aversion, although
the LA and UA results demonstrate that the subjects were not ambiguity neutral. This may seem at
odds with the ambiguity literature, in which there is ample evidence for ambiguity aversion (see,
for instance, the references in Table 3.4 of Trautmann and Van De Kuilen, 2015). Perhaps our
implementation of the random incentive system may not have fully prevented some subjects from
perceiving it as a way to hedge against the ambiguity. We may therefore have underestimated the
level of ambiguity aversion. Furthermore, despite our efforts to make the outcomes salient (placing
20The significance was marginal according to a two-sided test; this deviation would be significant at the 5% level
according to a one-sided test, which would be justified because we had a clear hypothesis regarding the direction of
the effect after the main experiment.
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the cash on the desk), the subjects also may have still considered the incentives to be low.21 An
alternative explanation, arising from the work done by Tversky in the 1990s (and formalized by
Tversky and Wakker, 1995) is that, for more extreme likelihood levels, upper and lower subaddi-
tivity matter more than binary complementarity. In other words, for rare events, overweighting is
stronger than ambiguity aversion.
In the experimental literature, it is common to provide an initial endowment to cover the losses
with which subjects are faced during an experiment (see, among many others, Cohen et al., 1987;
Eisenberger and Weber, 1995; Mason et al., 2005; Kermer et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2010).
However, we cannot know for sure whether the subjects perceived actual losses or whether they
mentally integrated the loss with the initial endowment and thus considered only gains. Several
papers have provided some evidence that subjects who are endowed with a monetary amount con-
sider it theirs (e.g., Mason et al., 2005; Kermer et al., 2006). However, we acknowledge that there
are better ways to investigate ‘real’ losses (not simply a loss frame). Abdellaoui and Kemel (2013)
provided subjects with a monetary endowment but caused them to lose time, such that they could
not easily integrate the loss with the endowment. Kocher et al. (2013) implemented “losses from
posterior endowment”, with subjects later winning back what they initially lost. Bosch-Dome`nech
and Silvestre (2010) provided the initial endowment months before the experiment to encourage
subjects to feel that it belonged to them. Unfortunately, we could not credibly implement any of
these solutions for the large monetary amount used in this experiment.22 As a positive consid-
eration, Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon (2011) found no differences in behavior in an experiment
comparing hypothetical losses, real losses, and prior endowments. For this reason, we felt it suit-
able to choose the prior endowment approach, but we are still careful to refer to the implemented
treatment as a loss frame to emphasize that it is a matter of framing/wording.
Ideally, we would expect that the LPA would extract from the data a profile of ambiguity-
neutral subjects with mean indices not significantly different from zero. Indeed, the LPAs for both
LA and UA yielded a profile very close to ambiguity neutrality, with very low indices and very
low variance within this group. However, the mean indices were still significantly positive for
this profile. Alternatively, we could have pre-defined the profiles and forced one profile to exhibit
parameters equal to zero. This approach would result in an obvious but forced ambiguity-neutral
profile. We believe that by allowing the data to speak for themselves, we were able to obtain results
that are less perfect but more powerful.
Previous research regarding unlikely events has not extended much further than events with
21Surprisingly, we did observe mild ambiguity aversion in the robustness check conducted online and reported in
Appendix 1.C, although the incentives in that experiment were less salient.
22It is difficult to force subjects to lose e300 worth of time, or to gain consent to participate if there is no guarantee
that they will have to pay such an amount, or to be sure that they will show up after receiving such a large amount in
advance.
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likelihoods of approximately 5% or 10%. Such studies either have found that events were over-
weighted (Chipman, 1960; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Curley and Yates, 1989; Casey and Scholz,
1991) or have not rejected ambiguity neutrality (Curley and Yates, 1985; Sarin and Weber, 1993).
Two studies used stimuli more similar to ours but did not address the three challenges identified in
the introduction to this paper (incentives, isolation of ambiguity attitudes, and control for beliefs).
In a hypothetical experiment, Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) did not reject ambiguity neutrality for
extremely unlikely events, but their study also did not control for beliefs. Schade et al. (2012)
reported that subjects were more willing to pay for insurance in an ambiguous scenario than in
a risky one, but this difference cannot be interpreted as a manifestation of ambiguity attitudes
because they could not properly control for beliefs.
Crucially, our results rely on the events of interest being explicitly described. We cannot infer
people’s behavior when the relevant events are implicit, such that people may be unaware or at
least not fully aware of them. Such unawareness is certainly pervasive in real life, but there are
also many situations in which events are explicitly described, for instance, in insurance contracts.
Rare events exert greater influence in isolation. The subjects in our experiment assigned higher
weights to events when they were isolated than when they were combined. Such behavior can
be exploited, following arguments presented by Rabin and Thaler (2001) for loss aversion. These
authors explained how myopic behavior (making decisions one after another without considering
the overall consequences) and loss aversion can lead to money-pumping situations if people make
small-scale insurance decisions one after another instead of considering the overall impact in terms
of risk reduction. Overweighting of rare events will reinforce this pattern. Myopic agents will be
prone to overinsure if they are presented with each possible (negative) event one after another, in
isolation, instead of as a package.
1.6. Conclusion
Very unlikely events loom larger than they are. In an experiment, while controlling for risk attitudes
and beliefs, we zoomed in on rare events. Using non-parametric tests, we found that the effect of
a change from “no gain” to “some possibility of gain” was larger than the effect of a change
from “some possibility of gain” to “greater possibility of gain”. Similarly, the effect of a change
from “certain gain” to “some possibility of gain” was larger than the effect of a change from “some
possibility of gain” to “less possibility of gain”. Both patterns were similar for losses. By means of
latent profile analysis, we examined the heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes. The results revealed
that one third of our sample was consistently close to ambiguity neutrality, whereas the remaining
two thirds showed mild or extreme overweighting. Such behavior is consistent with the mere
perception of ambiguity in models such as the alpha-maxmin model. It can also lead to suboptimal
situations such as overinsurance or overinvestment in long shots.
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Appendix 1.A Additional information about the main experi-
ment
1.A.1 Additional questions
The full experiment consisted of three sets of questions. Sets A and B have been described in Table
1. Set C is described in Table 4. To implement Set C, we asked the subjects to choose values for
4 between 1 and 100 (while the values for all other symbols could be between 1 and 200).
Table 4: Events and their descriptions
Set Event Description: the ticket drawn from the bag is marked with...
C
F − {4} ...any number between 1 and 100 except for the number chosen by
the subject for4.
F ...any number between 1 and 100.
FC ...any number between 101 and 200.
FC ∪ {4} ...any number between 101 and 200 or the number chosen by the
subject for4.
Figure 5 shows the distributions of the matching probabilities for Set C. The event F − {4}
seems not to have been understood by many participants; this led to a high variation in the answers,
much higher than for any of the other matching probabilities. For this reason, we decided to
exclude the entire set from the analysis.
Numbers are reported as percentages.
Every boxplot has lines at Q1, the median, and Q3. The adjacent lines show the most extreme values within 1.5 times
the IQR of the nearer quartile.
Figure 5: Median matching probabilities for moderate-likelihood events
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1.A.2 Stimuli: Choice list
In each question in Set A and Set B, the subjects were given a list of choices placing one fixed
uncertain bet (Option 1) against 20 different risky bets (Option 2). The subjects were then asked
to make a choice between the uncertain and risky bets for each of these 20 cases. The questions in
Set C were prepared similarly; however, the number of risky bets in the choice list was 30 instead
of 20. The reason for this difference was to ensure that the subjects would make the same number
of choices in each set, namely, 120. An equal number of choices in each set was necessary for our
incentive system, in which we used envelopes to determine the choice to be played for real (see
Figure 6 for a sample question from Set C).
An ambiguity-neutral subject believing that all numbers were equally likely to be drawn from
the bag would assign a probability of 0.5% to each number. For such a subject, the uncertain events
in Sets A, C, and B would have probabilities ranging from 0.5% to 3%, from 49.5% to 50.5%, and
from 97.5% to 99.5%, respectively. The lists of probabilities in the risky bets presented in our
questions were constructed such that the probability differences between the two rows decreased
as the rows approached the subjective probability of an ambiguity-neutral subject believing all
numbers were equally likely (ambiguity-neutral probability). This arrangement might have as-
sisted the subjects in interpreting the likelihoods of given events and might have led them toward
ambiguity neutrality. If this was the case, our results are conservative.
1.A.3 Incentives
The chances of playing for real were determined by drawing from a box containing 50 envelopes.
The distribution of the envelopes in this box was as follows:
- 47 envelopes containing a blank ticket
- 1 envelope containing a ticket for Set A
- 1 envelope containing a ticket for Set B
- 1 envelope containing a ticket for Set C
Here, a blank ticket meant that the subject would win nothing in the gain treatment and would lose
e300 in the loss treatment. Any one of the other three tickets meant that a choice from the set
specified on the ticket would be played for real.
A second box containing 120 envelopes was also prepared to determine which specific choice
would be played if the envelope drawn from the first box contained a non-blank ticket. The tickets
in the second box were marked with the codes that appeared in each row of the choice list in each
question. Hence, the combination of the tickets drawn from the two boxes uniquely determined
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Figure 6: Sample question from Set C
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the choice to be played for real.
The ambiguous bags were created separately for each session and each subject. Therefore,
communication between the subjects outside of the laboratory was irrelevant, and the outcomes
for different subjects did not depend on each other.
The probabilities associated with the risky bets (Option 2) were implemented using three ten-
sided dice that together could generate all possible numbers from 00.0 to 99.9 up to one decimal
place. Hence, for example, a subject in the gain treatment who chose Option 2 for an X% proba-
bility of winning e300 would win if the dice showed a number strictly below X. Both the dice and
the bags were shown to the subjects before they began answering the questions.
If a subject was to play a choice for real, it was done privately, and the payments were kept
anonymous.
Out of the 99 subjects, no one decided to withdraw from the experiment once they had read the
instructions. In total, 5 subjects drew a non-empty envelope from the first box, and 3 of them were
paid e300 in accordance with the outcome of the play.
1.A.4 Matching probabilities
There were 22 subjects who gave at least one counterintuitive answer. We defined a counterintuitive
answer for a subject in the gain treatment as a preference for a 0% probability of gain over some
uncertain chance of winning or a refusal of a 100% probability of gain. Similarly, for a subject in
the loss treatment, a counterintuitive answer was defined as the rejection of a 0% probability of loss
or a preference for a 100% probability of loss over some uncertain chance of no loss. We treated
such answers as erroneous and concluded that subjects who made such mistakes did not answer
the questions carefully. However, it should be noted that because of the nature of the experiment,
it was easy to select a column incorrectly by mistake, and the majority of these subjects made only
one such mistake. Therefore, for the optimal usage of the available data, instead of completely
eliminating those subjects from the analysis, we eliminated only the observations corresponding to
such answers.
We did not impose a maximum one-time switching rule. Therefore, the subjects could switch
between the two bets in a given choice list as many times as they wished. In total, 5 subjects
switched multiple times. Calculating the matching probabilities for such observations would re-
quire strong assumptions, from which we refrained for the entire analysis. Hence, we treated these
subjects in the same manner as those discussed above and did not include the observations for
which there were multiple switches in our analysis.
For censored observations (when the subjects never switched between the bets and always
chose the same option in a given choice list), the matching probabilities were set equal to the
highest probability available in the choice list (5.5%) for the events in Set A (very unlikely events)
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or to the lowest probability available in the choice list (94.5%) for the events in Set B (very likely
events). For the events in Set C, the applied correction depended on the treatment. If Option 1 was
always chosen, then the matching probabilities for the gain (loss) treatment were set equal to the
highest (lowest) available probability (75% (25%)), and the opposite probability assignments were
made if Option 2 was always chosen.
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Appendix 1.B LPA covariance matrices
Table 5: Estimated variance-covariance matrices for the LA index
Profile 1
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) LA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}) LA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡})
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) 0.61∗∗
(0.20)
LA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}) 0.14 0.28∗
(0.09) (0.12)
LA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}) 0.36∗ 0.07 0.66∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.08) (0.18)
Profile 2
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) LA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}) LA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡})
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) 4.44∗∗∗
(1.19)
LA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}) 2.25∗ 4.69∗∗∗
(0.94) (1.23)
LA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}) 2.54∗∗ 0.42 4.22∗∗∗
(0.92) (0.87) (1.15)
Profile 3
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) LA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}) LA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡})
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) 0.04∗∗∗
(0.00)
LA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}) -0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
LA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}) 0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Numbers are reported as percentages
Standard errors are shown in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Estimated variance-covariance matrices for the UA index
Profile 1
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) UA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C) UA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C)
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 0.33∗∗∗
(0.09)
UA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C) 0.24∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(0.09) (0.13)
UA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 0.14∗ 0.04 0.27∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Profile 2
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) UA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C) UA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C)
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 3.85∗∗∗
(1.06)
UA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C) 1.40∗ 3.10∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.79)
UA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 1.72+ -1.37 6.00∗∗∗
(0.95) (0.84) (1.43)
Profile 3
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) UA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C) UA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C)
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 0.20∗∗∗
(0.00)
UA({4}, {9,,#,♦, ‡}C) 0.93∗∗∗ 6.75∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
UA({9,}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 0.16∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Numbers are reported as percentages
Standard errors are shown in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix 1.C Robustness check of the elicitation method
We describe here the online experiment mentioned in the Discussion section. It was conducted to
test the robustness of the results against middle bias.
1.C.1 Method
1.C.1.1 Subjects and procedure
The subjects were recruited from the same platform as for the experiment presented in the main
text. The experiment was conducted online, with N = 61 subjects (27 female, median age 22). We
used an online experiment because it was run during a period when most students had no obligation
to be on campus. As in the main experiment, a large majority of the subjects (84%) were studying
economics. Each subject took approximately 10-15 minutes to complete the online questionnaire.
1.C.1.2 Stimuli
We attempted to replicate our weakest results from the gain treatment, i.e., LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡})
and UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C). We elicited the matching probabilities of the events {4}, {#,♦, ‡}
and {4,#,♦, ‡} and those of their complements. Instead of choice lists, we used a bisection
method. We asked the subjects to indicate their preferences between an uncertain bet and a risky
bet, starting with the probability that an ambiguity-neutral subject with uniform beliefs would
choose (see Figure 7). If a subject preferred the uncertain bet (the risky bet), we increased
(decreased) the probability associated with the risky bet in the next question. We continued to
increase/decrease the probability associated with the risky bet (Option 2) in three subsequent
questions after the first one. Once again, the probability increments were smaller around the
ambiguity-neutral probability and increased in size as we moved away from it. If we were to
represent the probabilities in a list, the probabilities that could potentially be queried against the
event {4,#,♦, ‡} would be as shown in Figure 8 below. Hence, the procedure was very similar
to the approach used in the main experiment, but it avoided any middle bias.
A disadvantage of the bisection method is that it takes more of the subjects’ time. Because
this second experiment was conducted online, it could not be too long; this is why we focused on
replicating only the weakest findings of the main experiment.
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Figure 7: Screenshot of the first question for the event {4,#,♦, ‡}
1.C.1.3 Incentives
The subjects were given the chance to play one of their choices for real. To prevent strategic
behavior such as always choosing Option 1 to increase the probability in Option 2,23 we did not
randomly select one of their actual choices; instead, we randomly selected one question (e.g., as
displayed in Figure 8), independently of whether this question was answered. Hence, the subjects’
answers had no impact on which question was used to determine the payment. If the subject had
answered the chosen question in the online experiment, the corresponding choice was directly
implemented. If not, the choice was inferred from the answers given by the subject to the other
questions using stochastic dominance24 (see Johnson et al., 2014, for more details on this method).
Ultimately, 5% of the subjects (3 subjects) were randomly selected and invited to play for real.
Which choice to play was again determined by envelopes that they drew upon arrival. In this
case, there was only one box of envelopes containing 82 envelopes, inside which were written all
possible event-probability pairs. The uncertain and risky bets were implemented with a bag and
dice, as in the first experiment. Since the subjects filled out the questionnaire online, we could only
tell them that they could win e300. We physically showed the e300 only to the subjects who were
invited to play for real.
1.C.1.4 Matching probabilities
The matching probabilities were calculated in the same way as in the main experiment. We did
not observe any subject to present counterintuitive answers, as in the first experiment. No subject
23This is a typical problem that arises when using random incentives with the bisection method.
24For example, if a subject preferred a 2% chance of winning e300 over a specific bet, it was inferred that they also
preferred a 3% chance of winning e300 over the same bet.
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Figure 8: List representation of the potential probabilities for the event {4,#,♦, ‡}
preferred a 0% probability of gain to some uncertain chance of winning or refused a 100% prob-
ability of gain. This suggests that we could eliminate mistakes that occurred as a consequence of
using choice lists. However, the bisection method also introduces its own complications.
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By the nature of the bisection design, the first question answered for each event determines
the direction of the probabilities presented in Option 2 in the subsequent questions. For a subject
who answers the first question mistakenly, it is not possible to change the direction back. Hence,
to check whether any subjects were forced to answer questions in the direction opposite to their
matching probabilities, we asked a 5th question for every event. This 5th question asked what they
would be asked if they were to answer the first question for that event differently. We checked
whether the answer to the 5th question was in the opposite direction from the answer to the first
question. In this way, we could detect subjects who had potentially made a mistake on the very
first question for a given event and for whom we had potentially miscalculated the matching prob-
abilities. We excluded such observations from our analysis.25
1.C.2 Results
Figure 9 shows the distributions of the matching probabilities. Once again, we see that the majority
of the subjects had matching probabilities equal to or greater than the probabilities an ambiguity-
neutral subject with uniform beliefs would have in Panel a and lower matching probabilities in
Panel b. These findings suggest the overweighting of rare events.
(a) very unlikely events (b) very likely events
Numbers are reported as percentages.
Every boxplot has lines at Q1, the median, and Q3. The adjacent lines show the most extreme values within 1.5 times
the IQR of the nearer quartile.
Figure 9: Median matching probabilities for Experiment 2
The BC values differ significantly from 0 in all cases and always in the direction consistent with
ambiguity aversion. Both the LA and UA indices are slightly decreased in magnitude compared
with our previous analysis (see Table 2, where the median values are 0.15 for LA and 0.75 for
25Out of the 366 total observations, 20 were eliminated from the analysis in this way.
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Table 7: Median analysis for Experiment 2
Mean Standard deviation Median z score N
BC({4}) 0.26 0.96 0.00 ∗ 2.29 53
BC({#,♦, ‡}) 0.34 1.04 0.10 ∗∗ 3.12 56
BC({4,#,♦, ‡}) 0.13 0.99 0.00 ∗ 2.10 55
LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) 0.34 1.07 0.05 + 1.90 52
UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) 0.87 1.07 0.55 ∗∗∗ 5.14 51
N represents the number of subjects in a particular test
Numbers are reported as percentages
Stars indicate the significance levels of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
UA); however, we still see evidence of both lower and upper subadditivity. Hence, we were able
to replicate the weakest results of our main experiment even with a design that avoids middle bias.
Given the small number of index values extracted here, it is not possible to conduct an LPA
using the data from our second experiment. However, we can use the results from the first experi-
ment to gain a rough idea of what the results of such an analysis would be. Using the means and
standard errors of the related indices LA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}) and UA({4}, {#,♦, ‡}C) for Profile
1 (see Table 3), we categorized the subjects into “Profile 1” and “others”. We found that the pro-
portions of subjects assigned to Profile 1 and others were respectively 79% and 21% for the LA
index and 53% and 47% for the UA index.26 Compared with our previous results, the proportion
of subjects assigned to near ambiguity neutrality is higher for the LA index, whereas the result for
the UA index is similar. This finding is not surprising since the only LA index considered here
is the one that was the closest to lower additivity in the previous analysis. As before, we observe
more upper subadditivity than lower subadditivity.
26A subject was assigned to Profile 1 with respect to a given index if their index value was strictly smaller than
mean + 2 × Standard Error. The numbers of subjects for whom we could calculate the LA and UA indices were 51
and 50, respectively.
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Probability weighting and underprevention ∗
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2.1 Introduction
Keeney (2008) pointed out that most deaths in the United States, and probably elsewhere, are
attributable to people’s personal decisions, such as smoking and eating too much or exercising
too little. People undertake too little prevention (or self-protection1), which leads to increased
mortality and impaired quality of life. Underprevention is a likely cause of the explosion in health
care spending which takes up a sizable part of GDP in developed economies (e.g. 17.9% in the
US in 20162). Two possible reasons for underprevention are moral hazard, people expecting to
get health care anyhow, and a misperception of the risks involved. The issue of moral hazard
was discussed in depth by Arrow (1963) in his classical paper, which marked the start of health
economics.
In that paper, Arrow first established a theory of “ideal insurance” and then discussed the impact
of various market failures, like moral hazard. In a perfect setting, a risk-neutral insurer should
adopt the insured’s risk and the actions of the insured should not affect the probability of the risk
occurring. Such a perfect setting is unrealistic for health risks, as pointed out by Arrow, especially
due to information asymmetries. Arrow’s analysis led to the widely-held belief that insurance and
prevention are substitutes: more insurance leads to less self-protection. Ehrlich and Becker (1972)
challenged this thesis by showing that insurance and prevention can be complements. To make
their point, they introduced the first model of prevention.
∗Published as “Baillon, A., H. Bleichrodt, A. Emirmahmutoglu, J.G. Jaspersen and R. Peter (forthcoming). When
risk perception gets in the way: Probability weighting and underprevention. Operations Research.”
1By prevention, we refer to activities that reduce the probability of a bad outcome. In the literature, it is sometimes
also called self-protection or primary prevention.
2Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, see https://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/
NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html
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It is questionable whether moral hazard can explain underprevention. Health insurance only
covers the financial aspects of poor health but avoiding poor health has value in itself (Cutler and
Zeckhauser, 2000; Jaspersen and Richter, 2015).3 This leaves misperceived risks as an alternative,
more plausible explanation. Ehrlich and Becker and later prevention models assume perfectly
rational, expected utility agents. This assumption is justified in economics by taking “rational
behavior as a first approximation to actual behavior”(Arrow, 1951). Puzzling actual behavior, such
as the underprevention highlighted by Keeney (2008), calls for going beyond the first, rational
approximation. Arrow (1982) discussed how deviations from rationality (relaxing expected utility
and Bayesianism) can explain anomalies such as the low uptake of flood insurance and financial-
market puzzles. In the present paper, we study how people’s imperfect perception of probabilities
can lead to suboptimal prevention efforts.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated that people tend to be insufficiently sensitive to
changes in probabilities, unless certainty or impossibility is involved, in which case they tend to
overreact. Such behavior is described by an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function (Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1992). Prevention efforts differ from full insurance in that they reduce the risks
of bad outcomes but do not entirely exclude them. Consequently, probability insensitivity blurs the
benefits of prevention. The same probability weighting function that can lead to overinsurance can
create underprevention. In only reducing the risks of bad outcomes, prevention is similar to prob-
abilistic insurance, which as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Wakker et al. (1997) showed, is
usually considered highly unattractive by agents.
We use a general setting, where the risk borne by the agent can affect his financial situa-
tion and/or his health and where the effects of effort need not be separable from the utility over
wealth and health. We compare the prevention efforts of an agent with inverse S-shaped probability
weighting with those of his rational twin, who has the same utility but does not weigh probabili-
ties and behaves according to expected utility. The benchmark for optimal prevention is therefore
personal and is determined by the agent’s utility. Deviations from optimality are determined by
his individual probability weighting function. Our paper characterizes the range of probabilities
for which underprevention will occur. Combining the literature on probability weighting and the
literature on prevention, our results indicate that in many cases, people’s prevention efforts will be
too low.
We conclude by considering the case where the probabilities of bad outcomes are not precisely
3Using a model of ex-ante moral hazard, Dionne (1982) showed that the effect of insurance coverage on prevention
is less important in health insurance than in property insurance unless the marginal utility of money is significantly
larger in the bad health state than in the good health state. Seog (2012) showed that when treatment has a preventive
aspect, the effect of moral hazard will likely become even less important and insurance cover can actually increase
prevention. This is also supported by the empirical evidence in Finkelstein et al. (2012) who showed that health
insurance increases the amount of preventive care accessed by individuals. It is thus unlikely that health insurance is
the key explanation for underprevention.
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known. We show that in this case ambiguity amplifies the effects of probability weighting and
leads to further underprevention. Our results imply that an important goal of health policy is to
reduce probability weighting, for instance by diminishing the ambiguity surrounding prevention
benefits. Helping people to correctly assess changes in probabilities can lead to more prevention
and, consequently, to less future treatment.
2.2 A model of prevention and probability weighting
2.2.1 Optimal prevention
We consider an agent who faces a binary risk. Each possible outcome consists of two attributes,
a financial and a health attribute. We write (xg, hg) for the outcome in the good state and (xb, hb)
for the outcome in the bad state with xg being preferred to xb (that is xg ≥ xb), hg being preferred
to hb and at least one preference being strict.4 The agent can engage in costly prevention efforts
to reduce the probability of the bad outcome. We denote the level of prevention by e ∈ [0, e] and
assume the probability of the bad outcome to be given by p(e), where p is a decreasing function
of e, that is p′(e) < 0. Consequently, the probability of the good outcome is (1 − p(e)) and is an
increasing function of effort.
Preferences over wealth, health and effort are represented by a trivariate utility function u(x, h; e)
with ux > 0, u(x, hg; e) ≥ u(x, hb; e) for any x and e, and ue < 0, where subscripts denote partial
derivatives. We take expected utility as the rational benchmark. The objective of the rational agent,
indicated by superscript ‘r’, is then given by
max
e∈[0,e]
U r(e) = p(e)u(xb, hb; e) + (1− p(e))u(xg, hg; e). (1)
Due to continuity, U r attains a maximum on [0, e], and we assume throughout the analysis that
solutions are interior, in which case the associated first-order condition (FOC) holds:5
−p′(er) [u(xg, hg; er)− u(xb, hb; er)]+[p(er)ue(xb, hb; er) + (1− p(er))ue(xg, hg; er)] = 0. (2)
er denotes the rational agent’s optimal level of prevention and pr the associated probability of
4Our analysis relies on ordinal properties of the health variable only as in many applications health is not cardinal.
The two attributes are positively correlated across states, which makes it clear which outcome is good and which one
is bad. The techniques in this paper are also applicable when the two attributes correlate negatively. Distinguishing
the good from the bad outcome then requires knowledge of the agent’s preferences beyond monotonicity.
5If no effort were optimal, probability weighting could only lead to more effort, and if the maximum possible effort
were optimal, probability weighting could only lead to less effort. In both cases, the question we ask in this paper has
a trivial answer for lack of economic trade-off.
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the bad outcome, that is pr = p(er). The first term in Eq. (2) represents the marginal benefit of
prevention in the sense that effort increases the odds of the good state, which raises expected utility.
The second term in Eq. (2) represents the marginal cost of prevention in the sense that effort is
costly, which lowers expected utility. In equilibrium, the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost,
and the agent has no incentive to deviate from his level of prevention, consistent with his choice
being optimal.
2.2.2 Probability weighting
Prevention reduces risks by lowering the probability of the bad state but it typically does not elim-
inate them. Therefore agents need to compare two different risky situations to determine the value
of prevention. Such comparisons are susceptible to behavioral biases which lead to violations of
expected utility. Probability weighting can explain several deviations from expected utility. Before
we explore the effects of probability weighting on optimal prevention, we recall the core proper-
ties of probability weighting functions and present some common classes of probability weighting
functions. We start with the following standard definition.
Definition 1. A probability weighting function is a strictly increasing function w defined on prob-
abilities p in [0, 1] with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
Definition 1 states that probability weighting functions respect monotonicity. They allow to
introduce nonlinearity in probability, a common empirical regularity of choice under risk (see
Camerer, 1989; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996). We state two more properties.
Definition 2. A probability weighting function is called:
(i) Regressive if it intersects the diagonal only once and from above.
(ii) Cavex if it is first concave and then convex.
If a probability weighting function satisfies both (i) and (ii), we call it inverse S-shaped.
The term “regressive” to characterize Property (i) was used by Prelec (1998). This property
is also commonly referred to as overweighting of small and underweighting of large probabilities,
with a fixed point p∗ ∈ (0, 1) that separates small from large probabilities. This fixed point is
about 1/3, a property that Prelec (1998) called asymmetry. Property (ii) implies that changes in
probability have less impact as one moves away from the endpoints of the unit interval. If it holds,
we can find an inflection point p˜ ∈ (0, 1) that separates the concave from the convex portio of
the probability weighting function. Prelec (1998) called Property (ii) ‘S shaped’. In the literature,
inverse S-shaped is now more commonly used than S-shaped but authors do not always distinguish
Property (i) and Property (ii). We use Wakker’s (2010) term cavexity for Property (ii) to avoid
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confusion. Notice that the two properties are not equivalent because there are regressive probability
weighting functions with multiple changes in curvature and cavex probability weighting functions
that do not intersect the diagonal.
There are many classes of probability weighting functions that are inverse S-shaped for certain
parameter values, and we list the most common ones in Table 1. The TK form was proposed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Monotonicity requires α ≥ 0.28, and an inverse S-shape
holds for α < 1. The case α = 1 corresponds to expected utility because then the probability
weighting function is the identity, w(p) = p. Goldstein and Einhorn (1987, GE) introduced a
generalized two-parameter specification of this function.6 Here, the parameter α primarily controls
curvature whereas parameter β primarily controls elevation. Monotonicity holds for any α, β > 0,
and the probability weighting function is inverse S-shaped whenever α < 1. Starting from an
axiomatization, Prelec (1998) defined two probability weighting functions. The one-parameter
function Prelec-1 is monotonic for α > 0 and inverse S-shaped for α < 1. For this class of
probability weighting functions the fixed point coincides with the inflection point at 1/e. In the
corresponding two-parameter version Prelec-2, the parameter α again controls curvature and β
elevation. It is monotonic for α, β > 0 and inverse S-shaped for α < 1.
Abbreviation Reference Equation
TK-92 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) w(p) = p
α
[pα+(1−p)α] 1α
GE Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) w(p) = βp
α
βpα+(1−p)α
Prelec-1 Prelec (1998) w(p) = exp(−(− ln p)α)
Prelec-2 Prelec (1998) w(p) = exp(−β(− ln p)α)
Neo Wakker (2010) w(p) =

0, if p = 0,
α−β
2
+ (1− α)p, if p ∈ (0, 1),
1, if p = 1,
Table 1: Common parametric forms of w(p) as put forward in the literature.
All these examples of probability weighting functions are continuous on [0, 1] and are twice
differentiable on (0, 1), even in those cases when their shape is not inverse S. Because these con-
ditions will be helpful in our analysis, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3. A probability weighting function is called regular if it is continuous on [0, 1] and
twice differentiable on (0, 1).
We use this definition to obtain the following Lemma, which introduces an important region in
case of an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function.7
6See also Lattimore et al. (1992), Tversky and Fox (1995) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999).
7All mathematical proofs are in Appendix ??.
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Lemma 1. For any regular inverse S-shaped probability weighting function w, we can find p1 ∈
(0,min {p∗, p˜}) and p2 ∈ (max {p∗, p˜} , 1) such that w′(p) > 1 for p ∈ (0, p1)∪ (p2, 1), w′(p) = 1
for p ∈ {p1, p2} and w′(p) < 1 for p ∈ (p1, p2).
Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions capture the idea of likelihood oversensitivity
for probabilities near the corners of the unit interval and likelihood insensitivity for intermediate
probabilities. We dub (p1, p2) the likelihood insensitivity region of probability weighting function
w.8 The Lemma shows that this region covers at least all probabilities between the fixed point
and the inflection point. l’Haridon and Vieider (2018) elicited probability weighting functions in
30 countries all over the world. On a global average, the insensitivity region according to their
parameter estimates ranges from 8% to 84%. Table 5 in Appendix 2.B displays the likelihood
insensitivity regions for each country individually. Table 6 in Appendix 2.B gives the likelihood
insensitivity regions obtained from some other studies.9 For instance, Booij et al. (2010), reported
weighting functions for a large, representative sample of the Dutch population. Their insensitivity
region is [9%, 86%] (using Prelec’s two-parameter function).
A probability weighting function that pushes the idea of likelihood insensitivity to the limit is
the neo-additive class shown in the last row of Table 1 (Neo, see Wakker, 2010). Its parameters
are α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (−α, α). Parameter α captures the slope and was called the insensitivity
index by Abdellaoui et al. (2011). It is 0 for an expected utility agent and converges to 1 for an
individual who perceives all probabilities to be the same, e.g., 50-50. Parameter β is an index of
pessimism, measuring the average elevation of the weighting function. It is also 0 under expected
utility. An individual with extreme pessimism, acting as if the worst is always almost certain, has a
β parameter converging to −1. Several papers have emphasized the importance of this probability
weighting function (e.g., Cohen, 1992; Loomes et al., 2002; Chateauneuf et al., 2007; Teitelbaum,
2007), and Wakker (2010) argued that it provides an optimal trade-off between parsimony and fit.
It is regressive with overweighting of probabilities smaller than (α− β)/(2α) and underweighting
of probabilities larger than (α − β)/(2α). It is not regular, and we cannot apply Lemma 1. It is,
however, immediate that w′(p) = (1− α) < 1 for any p ∈ (0, 1) so that the insensitivity region is
given by the entire open unit interval, (0, 1). In our analysis of optimal prevention we will discuss
8By defining the insensitivity region based on the derivative of w, we deviate from Wakker (2010) who defined the
likelihood insensitivity region based on the properties of lower and upper subadditivity (Tversky and Wakker, 1995).
Wakker’s definition is also applicable to non-differentiable functions w. Our definition of the insensitivity region cap-
tures the same intuition, but it is not equivalent to Wakker’s definition. It is possible to construct counterexamples
where the region based on w′(p) < 1 is not a likelihood insensitivity region in the sense of Wakker (2010). The defini-
tion of Wakker (2010) does not rely on derivatives and therefore, does not rely on infinitesimal changes. This feature
is important for empirical work in which infinitesimal changes cannot be observed. However, Wakker’s definition is
not well-suited for the type of analysis conducted in this paper, which precisely makes use of derivatives. See footnote
10 for an example where our definition is better suited to the analysis of prevention.
9We selected studies that elicited weighting functions for losses (either independently or combined with gains).
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neo-additive weighting functions separately.
2.3 Applying probability weighting to prevention decisions
2.3.1 Some general results
We will now return to the problem of choosing an optimal level of prevention. To facilitate com-
parability, we study an agent who is identical to the rational agent in terms of the binary risk
exposure, the prevention technology and utility over wealth, health and effort. The only difference
is that his perception of risk is affected by probability weighting, which we indicate by superscript
‘w’. Given that the good state gives higher utility than the bad state and that prevention aims to
mitigate the potential loss of utility, the objective function is now given by:
max
e∈[0,e]
Uw(e) = w(p(e))u(xb, hb; e) + (1− w(p(e)))u(xg, hg; e). (3)
The first-order condition for an optimal solution is
Uwe (e
w) = − w′(p(ew))p′(ew) [u(xg, hg; ew)− u(xb, hb; ew)]
+ [w(p(ew))ue(xb, hb; e
w) + (1− w(p(ew)))ue(xg, hg; ew)] = 0,
(4)
where ew denotes the optimal level of prevention under probability weighting. When comparing
Eq. (2) and (4), we see that probability weighting affects both the marginal benefit and the marginal
cost of prevention. For probabilities in the likelihood insensitivity region, the marginal benefit of
prevention is lower than for the rational agent because the agent underappreciates the reduction in
the probability of the bad state. The reverse is true for probabilities in the likelihood oversensitivity
region, for which the agent overvalues the reduction of the probability of the bad state. The effect
of probability weighting on the marginal cost of prevention is unclear and depends on the effect
of effort on utility. If the probability of the bad state is overweighted, then there is more weight
on the marginal cost of effort in that state, and if the probability of the bad state is underweighted,
then the marginal cost of effort in the good state is overweighted. However, it is not clear in which
state the marginal effect of effort on utility is larger, so the overall effect remains inconclusive.
We can still compare the rational agent’s level of prevention with that under probability weight-
ing, depending on the magnitude of the rational agent’s equilibrium probability. Technically, our
proof relies on Uw(e) being concave on [0, e], which we assume to hold. We summarize our result
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume a regular inverse S-shaped probability weighting function. We can find
p ∈ (0,min{p∗, p˜}) and p ∈ (max{p∗, p˜}, 1) such that probability weighting lowers prevention if
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and only if the rational agent’s probability of the bad state lies between p and p.
We dub (p, p) the underprevention region because in this region probability weighting leads to
less preventive effort compared to the rational benchmark. The consequence is too much risk expo-
sure caused by the agent’s distorted perception of the costs and benefits of prevention. Proposition
1 says that probability weighting results in underprevention for intermediate loss probabilities.
Closer to the corners of the unit interval the reverse occurs, which is why we call (0, p)∪ (p, 1) the
overprevention region.
Notice the symmetry between Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. For intermediate loss probabilities,
inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions exhibit likelihood insensitivity and lead to un-
derprevention compared to the rational agent. Likewise, for probabilities towards the boundaries
of the unit interval, inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions exhibit likelihood oversensi-
tivity and lead to overprevention compared to the rational agent. This raises the question how the
likelihood insensitivity region and the underprevention region are related. The following proposi-
tion addresses this question and shows that its answer depends on the marginal utility of effort in
the good and in the bad state.
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions in Proposition 1 it holds that:
(i) p < p1 < p < p2 if the marginal cost of effort is higher in the bad state than in the good
state.
(ii) p = p1 and p = p2 if the marginal cost of effort is the same in both states.
(iii) p1 < p < p2 < p if the marginal cost of effort is higher in the good state than the bad state.
Proposition 2 informs us that the likelihood insensitivity region and the underprevention regions
coincide if and only if it is equally costly at the margin to exert effort in the good state and the
bad state.10 Intuitively, if the marginal cost of prevention does not depend on the realization of
the binary risk, it is also unaffected by the perception of this risk. In other words, probability
weighting only alters the marginal benefit of prevention, and our discussion of Eq. (4) already
identified likelihood in- and oversensitivity as the drivers for a lower or higher marginal benefit
compared to the rational agent. Table 5 in Appendix 2.B gives examples of insensitivity regions
for the Prelec-2 function. To further illustrate Lemma 1 and Proposition 2(ii), we determine the
likelihood insensitivity region numerically for the different classes of regular inverse S-shaped
probability weighting functions in Section 2.2.2. Figure 1 provides an overview. For the TK
probability weighting function, an increase in the parameter α increases p1 and decreases p2 so that
10Here we see an advantage of defining the insensitivity region from derivatives. With Wakker’s (2010) definition,
we would not obtain such equivalence between insensitivity and underprevention when the marginal cost of effort is
constant across states.
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Figure 1: Likelihood insensitivity regions for different probability weighting functions
the likelihood insensitivity region is contracted. Unlike the TK weighting function, the GE function
and Prelec-2 function separate curvature and elevation. The parameter β controls elevation in both
classes with higher values of β corresponding to more elevation in the GE and less elevation in the
Prelec-2 probability weighting functions. Panels (b) and (c) show that more elevation increases
both p1 and p2 so that the likelihood insensitivity region shifts to the right. At low elevation (low
β for GE and high β for Prelec-2), lowering α first increases p1 and then reduces it whereas it
always increases p2. Thus, an increase in curvature first moves the likelihood insensitivity region
to the left and then expands it. Likewise, at high elevation (high β for GE and low β for Prelec-2),
lowering α decreases p1 whereas it first decreases p2 and then increases it. Here, an increase in
curvature first moves the likelihood insensitivity region to the left and then expands it.
If the marginal cost of effort is affected by the risk, the underprevention region will either be
more to the left or more to the right than the likelihood insensitivity region and its width can also
differ. To further explore this issue, we denote the difference between the marginal cost of effort
in the bad state and the good state by d, that is d = |ue(xb, hb; er)| − |ue(xg, hg; er)|. Whether this
difference is positive or negative depends on the underlying preferences, and Table 2 provides an
overview.
uxe < 0 uxe = 0 uxe > 0
ue(x, hg; e) < ue(x, hb; e) − − +/−
ue(x, hg; e) = ue(x, hb; e) − 0 +
ue(x, hg; e) > ue(x, hb; e) +/− + +
Table 2: Sign of d as a function of preferences
If bad financial and/or bad health outcomes make efforts more costly at the margin, we are
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in case (i) of Proposition 2 and the underprevention region is located to the left of the likelihood
insensitivity region. We believe that this case is the most plausible as will be explained in Section
2.4.1 when we discuss how effort may affect the agent’s utility derived from wealth and health. In
this case, likelihood insensitivity is neither necessary nor sufficient for underprevention as Figure
2 illustrates. We can find probabilities between p and p1 where underprevention occurs despite
the agent’s likelihood oversensitivity and we can also find probabilities between p and p2 where
overprevention occurs despite the agent’s likelihood insensitivity.
0 𝑝𝑝1 �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝∗ 𝑝𝑝2 1𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟
likelihood 
oversensitivity
likelihood 
oversensitivity
likelihood 
insensitivity
over
prevention
over
prevention
under
prevention
Figure 2: Likelihood insensitivity and underprevention region in Proposition 2(i)
2.3.2 Comparative statics
Proposition 1 characterizes how probability weighting affects the agent’s prevention decision by
identifying the underprevention region. Proposition 2 shows that the location of the underpreven-
tion region relative to the likelihood insensitivity region depends on how the marginal cost of effort
varies with the state of nature. To gain further insight into the determinants of the underprevention
region, we investigate how it is affected by the exogenous parameters of our model.
We focus on case (i) in Proposition 2, but similar techniques apply to case (iii). Let κ =
ue(xb, hb; e
r)/ue(xg, hg; e
r) be the ratio of the marginal cost of effort in the bad state to the marginal
cost of effort in the good state. It measures how much more costly effort is at the margin when
going from the good to the bad state of nature. We are in case (i) if uxe ≥ 0 and ue(x, hg; e) ≥
ue(x, hb; e) with at least one inequality strict (see Table 2). Then κ > 1. Several of our comparative
statics predictions require comparing effort elasticities, which we define next.
Definition 4. We introduce the following effort elasticities:
(i) εp(e) = −ep′(e)p(e) for the loss probability.
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(ii) εux(x, h; e) = e
uxe(x,h;e)
ux(x,h;e)
for the marginal utility of wealth.
(iii) ε∆h(x, hg, hb; e) = e
ue(x,hg ;e)−ue(x,hb;e)
u(x,hg ;e)−u(x,hb;e) for the utility gain from better health.
(iv) εue(x, h; e) = e
uee(x,h;e)
ue(x,h;e)
for the marginal cost of effort.
For the loss probability, the marginal utility of wealth and the marginal cost of effort, we
use point elasticities because we can take derivatives with respect to the underlying attributes.
The effort elasticity of the loss probability has a natural interpretation because it measures how
a percentage increase in effort translates into a percentage decrease of the probability of the bad
state.11 The effort elasticities of the marginal utility of wealth and of the marginal cost of effort
will be discussed in further detail in Section 2.4.1. For health, we define an arc elasticity to reflect
that health may be an ordinal variable. Our results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume a regular inverse S-shaped probability weighting function.
(i) The underprevention region (p, p) is negatively associated with κ.
Furthermore, let uxe ≥ 0 and ue(x, hg; e) ≥ ue(x, hb; e) with at least one inequality strict (case (i)
of Proposition 2), and assume that the marginal cost of effort is more elastic in the bad state than
in the good state (i.e., εue(xb, hb; e) ≥ εue(xg, hg; e)). Then:
(ii) An increase in xg shifts the underprevention region to the left.
(iii) An increase in xb shifts the underprevention region to the right if εp(e) > εux(x, h; e).
(iv) An improvement in hg shifts the underprevention region to the left.
(v) An improvement in hb shifts the underprevention region to the right if εp(e) > ε∆h(x, hg, hb; e).
Proposition 3(i) says that the underprevention region moves to the left if exerting effort be-
comes more costly in the bad than the good state. It is therefore more likely to contain small
probabilities, which is typical of many real-world prevention problems. A similar phenomenon
occurs when comparing small to large risks. Assume a spread in consumption levels in the good
and the bad state, that is an increase in xg and a decrease in xb. Proposition 3(ii) and (iii) say this
also shifts the underprevention region to the left so that it contains more small probabilities. In
other words, risks with more severe financial consequences are more likely to result in underpre-
vention when the agent weighs probabilities. Similarly, a spread in health, an improvement in hg
coupled with a deterioration in hb, shifts the underprevention region to the left as implied by results
11Hofmann and Peter (2015) and Courbage et al. (2017) showed the usefulness of this measure in the comparative
statics analysis of several intertemporal prevention problems.
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Figure 3: Underprevention region as a function of κ for different probability weighting functions
(iv) and (v) of Proposition 3. Again, more severe health risks are more prone to underprevention
when the agent weighs probabilities. Underprevention tends to be more concerning for severe than
for mild risks.
We provide an illustration in Figure 3. Given that κ is a complex function of the rational agent’s
preferences over wealth and health, the endowments in both attributes and the available preven-
tion technology, we opt for a stylized analysis by letting κ vary between 1/3 and 3. We use the
parameter estimates from Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Etchart-Vincent (2004), l’Haridon and
Vieider (2018), and Booij et al. (2010) for the TK, the GE and the Prelec-2 probability weighting
functions. Consistent with Proposition 3, an increase in κ lowers both p and p so that the underpre-
vention region as a whole shifts to the left. The lines are mildly convex so that changes in κ have a
larger effect when κ is low than when it is high. This also implies that changes in κ affect the width
of the underprevention region, not only its location. The strongest effect of changes in κ occurs for
Etchart-Vincent’s parameter estimates of the GE probability weighting function. Overall though,
changes in the parameters of the probability weighting function (see Figure 1) appear to have a
stronger influence on the location of the insensitivity region, and hence the location of the under-
prevention region, than changes in κ. This highlights the importance of probability weighting in
explaining underprevention.
2.3.3 Neo-additive probability weighting
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, neo-additive probability weighting functions maximize the likeli-
hood insensitivity region and are flatter than the identity function on the entire open unit interval.
They could be classified as weakly cavex and do not satisfy regularity due to discontinuities at
0 and 1. As a result, Propositions 1 to 3 do not apply, and we study the effect of neo-additive
probability weighting on optimal prevention separately in this section. The following proposition
summarizes our results.
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Proposition 4. Let w be a neo-additive probability weighting function as defined in the last row of
Table 1 with parameters α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (−α, α). Then:
(i) Probability weighting leads to underprevention for all pr.
(ii) An increase in α (likelihood insensitivity) leads to more underprevention.
(iii) A decrease in β (pessimism) leads to more underprevention if and only if the marginal cost
of effort is higher in the bad state than the good state.
Neo-additive probability weighting affects both the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of
prevention relative to the rational agent. The marginal benefit is reduced by (1 − α) due to like-
lihood insensitivity. The effect on the marginal cost is twofold: It is also reduced by a factor
of (1 − α) but there is an additional effect arising from over- and underweighting of probabili-
ties. As a result, the marginal cost of prevention under neo-additive probability weighting can be
higher or lower than that of the rational agent. Part (ii) of Proposition 4 shows, however, that even
when the marginal cost of prevention falls, it will not outweigh the drop in the marginal benefit.
Consequently, an increase in α always leads to an increase in underprevention.
The parameter α measures likelihood insensitivity in neo-additive probability weighting func-
tions, see Baillon et al. (2017). Part (ii) of Proposition 4 shows that more likelihood insensitivity
leads to more underprevention. The parameter β can be interpreted as a measure of pessimism,
with lower values corresponding to more pessimism and more overweighting of the probability of
a bad outcome (Baillon et al., 2017). Pessimism does not affect the marginal benefit of prevention,
but it reduces the marginal cost of prevention whenever the marginal cost of effort is higher in the
bad state than the good state. This results in more underprevention.
Neo-additive probability weighting functions have specific characteristics that put our previous
results into perspective. The underprevention region is maximal and equal to (0, 1). It does not
depend on the parameters of the neo-additive probability weighting function, unlike in the case of
regular inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions. The amount of underprevention does de-
pend on the parameters of the neo-additive probability weighting function, but the underprevention
region always coincides with the likelihood insensitivity region, independent of how the marginal
cost of effort varies with the state of nature. Comparative statics questions about its location
therefore become vacuous. If we view neo-additive probability weighting functions as linear ap-
proximations of more complex inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions, we can interpret
underprevention as the first-order effect of likelihood insensitivity. The existence of non-empty
overprevention regions at the corners of the unit interval is a direct consequence of regularity, and
specifically continuity, of all parametric inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions. This
continuity “forces” the probability weighting function to exhibit likelihood oversensitivity close to
the boundaries 0 and 1, which increases the marginal benefit of prevention relative to the rational
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agent. If likelihood insensitivity is the main characteristic of an agent’s risk perception, as the neo-
additive weighting function suggests, underprevention will imply that the agent faces too much
risk.
2.4 Applications
2.4.1 Specific cost structures
Our model of optimal prevention in Eq. (1) is very general in that it allows for both financial
and non-financial attributes of utility as well as a non-separable effect of effort on utility. Most
extant research on optimal prevention imposes more specific assumptions. We discuss some of
these more restrictive specifications and explain how we can obtain them as special cases of our
analysis.
Disutility. If the cost of effort is measured in units of utility, we can write
u(x, h; e) = v(x, h)− φ(e), (5)
where v is utility over wealth and health and φ(e) is a measure of the disutility of effort with φ′(e) >
0. Such a specification is also referred to as a separable or non-tangible cost of effort. A special
case is that of intertemporal prevention where an agent incurs a monetary cost of effort in the first
period to mitigate a future risk exposure that is not resolved until the second period (see Menegatti,
2009). It is immediate that the marginal cost of effort does not depend on the state of the world
in such a situation, and we are in case (ii) of Proposition 2. The underprevention region coincides
with the likelihood insensitivity region for any regular inverse S-shaped probability weighting
function. Questions of comparative statics with respect to determinants of the rational agent’s
choice problem become vacuous in such a case.
Monetary cost, monetary risk. If the cost of effort is monetary with an increasing cost function
c(e) and the health attribute is constant (that is hg ∼ hb), we obtain
u(x, h; e) = v(x− c(e)). (6)
This case is also referred to as a non-separable or tangible cost of effort. Peter (2017) showed
that intertemporal prevention problems with an upfront monetary cost lead to the same results as
two-period prevention problems with endogenous saving. In this situation, the marginal cost of
effort is larger in the bad state than in the good state for a risk-averse agent because
− ue(xb, hb; e) = c′(e) · v′(xb − c(e)) > c′(e) · v′(xg − c(e)) = −ue(xg, hg; e) (7)
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whenever v is concave. Thus, we are in case (i) of Proposition 2 and the underprevention region
is to the left of the likelihood insensitivity region for any regular inverse S-shaped probability
weighting function. The effort elasticities of the marginal utility of wealth and the marginal cost
of effort simplify to
εux(x, h; e) = ec
′(e)
[
−v
′′(x− c(e))
v′(x− c(e))
]
and εue(x, h; e) = e
c′′(e)
c′(e)
+ ec′(e)
[
−v
′′(x− c(e))
v′(x− c(e))
]
,
(8)
and are directly related to the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Requiring the
marginal cost of effort to be more elastic in the bad than in the good state amounts to assum-
ing that utility function v exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, a familiar condition in utility
theory about which Arrow (1971, pp. 96) wrote that it “seems supported by everyday observation.”
Monetary cost. If health does matter, we can write
u(x, h; e) = v(x− c(e), h), (9)
where v is utility over wealth and health. The marginal cost of effort is larger in the bad state than
in the good state if and only if
v′(xb − c(e), hb)− v′(xg − c(e), hb) > v′(xg − c(e), hg)− v′(xg − c(e), hb). (10)
The left-hand side of Eq. (10) is the risk aversion effect encountered before. It implies that the
marginal cost of effort is higher in the bad state than in the good state. The right-hand side com-
pares the marginal utility of wealth in good and in bad health. The extant research suggests that
the marginal utility of wealth is increasing in health for severe injuries (Viscusi and Evans, 1990;
Sloan et al., 1998; Finkelstein et al., 2013) but decreasing in health for minor injuries (Evans and
Viscusi, 1991). In the first situation the risk aversion effect and the effect of health changes on the
marginal utility of consumption have opposite effects and no clear conclusion can be drawn. The
second situation corresponds to case (i) of Proposition 2 and, consequently, the underprevention re-
gion is to the left of the likelihood insensitivity region for any regular inverse S-shaped probability
weighting function.
Disutility and monetary cost. We can also combine a monetary and a non-monetary cost of
effort so that
u(x, h; e) = v(x− c(e), h)− φ(e). (11)
This case is similar to the previous one. Whether the marginal cost of effort is higher in the bad or
in the good state of nature depends on whether the risk aversion effect exceeds the effect of health
state on the marginal utility of wealth. Given the above considerations, case (i) of Proposition 2
seems to be applicable to several relevant cases and we thus deem it as the most plausible for most
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applications.
2.4.2 Mortality
Our model of optimal prevention can be interpreted in terms of mortality reduction. If hg denotes
the “alive” state and hb the “deceased” state, we can interpret u(x, hg; e) as consumption utility
when alive and u(x, hb; e) as the utility of bequests. All our results continue to hold when allowing
ux(x, hb; e) ≥ 0, that is ux(x, hb; e) = 0 is not excluded (see Eeckhoudt and Hammitt, 2001).
When assuming ux(x, hg; e) > ux(x, hb; e), as is usual in the Value of a Statistical Life literature
(see Jones-Lee, 1974), the marginal cost of effort will be larger in the alive state than in the de-
ceased state whenever the bequest motive is sufficiently mild. Then, by Proposition 2 case (iii), the
underprevention region lies to the right of the likelihood insensitivity region for any regular inverse
S-shaped probability weighting function.
2.4.3 Other Reference Points
In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory, the probabilities of the most extreme outcomes
are weighted first. Consider a binary risk yielding a large loss with probability p and a smaller loss
otherwise. The utility of the large loss will be weighted by w(p) and the utility of the smaller loss
gets the remainder, (1− w(p)). Equation (3) can be interpreted as prospect theory for losses, with
(xg, hg; 0) being the reference point. This is a rather optimistic reference point (ending up in the
good state without any prevention). Then, (xb, hb; e) is the most extreme loss, but (xg, hg; e) is a
loss as well. In this model, w is the weighting function for losses, and we based our empirical
illustrations such as Figure 1 and Appendix 2.B on studies that elicited w for losses. A pessimistic
reference point could be (xb, hb; e), that is, being in the bad state in spite of having provided
maximum effort. With this reference point, the model should be translated to the gain domain. In
that case, the probability of the best outcome is weighted first. Hence, w(p) in Equation (3) should
be replaced by 1 − w+(1 − p), with w+ the weighting function for gains. Note that if w+(p) is
inverse S-shaped, then 1− w+(1− p) is also inverse S-shaped (as a function of p). Consequently,
all our theoretical results still hold after proper recoding of w and p in terms of w+ and (1 − p),
but the values obtained in the empirical illustrations may (slightly) differ.
One may wonder whether agents really consider all situations as losses (or all as gains) and
what our results would look like in a mixed framing. Even though we cannot answer this question
in general (for any reference point), we can study a form of stochastic reference points introduced
by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), a reference point that includes various possible outcomes. Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2007) put forward a model of a stochastic reference point in combination with so-
called reference-dependent preferences with loss aversion. We will briefly explain how we can
derive versions of our results under their model using their concept of a choice acclimated personal
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equilibrium. According to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), this equilibrium is appropriate if the agent
has enough time between the prevention decision and the resolution of uncertainty, that the decision
itself becomes the (stochastic) reference point. Specifically, an agent providing effort e would
use (xb, hb; e) as reference point with probability p(e) and (xg, hg; e) with probability (1 − p(e)).
The agent will therefore experience a gain with probability p(e)(1 − p(e) (the reference point is
(xb, hb; e) but he ends up in the good state) and a loss with the same probability (the reference
point is (xg, hg; e) but he ends up in the bad state). We assume axiom A3’ of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2007) such that the agent decides based on the weighted sum of consumption utility and piece-
wise linear gain-loss utility with loss aversion λ and weight η. In this setting, Barseghyan et al.
(2013) showed that the agent’s preferences can be represented as those of a probability weighting
agent with probability weighting function w(p) = p(1 + η(λ − 1)(1 − p)). Since loss aversion
implies λ > 1, this probability weighting function is concave on [0, 1] and likelihood insensitive for
p > 0.5. Even though the exact underprevention region will depend on the difference between the
marginal cost of effort in the bad state and in the good state, we can see that reference dependent
preferences will likely only lead to underprevention if the rational agent’s probability of the bad
state is relatively high. The reference-dependent loss aversion model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007)
is thus less suitable to explain underprevention in situations with moderate loss probabilities than
our model based on inverse S-shaped probability weighting.
2.4.4 The role of ambiguity
So far we have considered risk, i.e., situations in which probabilities are known. In most real-world
prevention decisions probabilities cannot be easily defined (Snow, 2011; Alary et al., 2013). Since
Ellsberg (1961), the absence of probabilistic information is referred to as ambiguity. The theoret-
ical literature on ambiguity tends to focus on ambiguity aversion but the experimental literature
also highlighted that ambiguity reinforces insensitivity (e.g., Tversky and Fox, 1995; Abdellaoui
et al., 2011). The intuition is that ambiguity has both a motivational effect, ambiguity aversion,
and a cognitive effect, with people having more difficulty to discriminate between likelihood levels
when likelihoods are imprecise.
Our results for risk indicate that more likelihood insensitivity leads to more underprevention.
We used the data of Abdellaoui et al. (2011), who found more likelihood insensitivity for ambiguity
than for risk, to illustrate that ambiguity reinforces underprevention. The size of the insensitivity
region, obtained from their data, is 3.4 points larger for ambiguity than for risk and shifts it to the
left.12 Ambiguity about the impact of prevention efforts can therefore increase the underprevention
12Risk: 12.60%-84.87% for gains (15.13%-87.40% for losses using the dual function). Ambiguity: 6.41%-82.08%
for gains (17.92%-93.59% for indirect losses).
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region.
We can also derive results for another ambiguity model alpha-maxmin, which is proposed in
Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) and axiomatized by Ghirardato et al. (2004). According to this model,
people have a set of priors in mind (a set of probabilities that they view as possible) and take a
linear combination of the best and the worst expected utility they may get. The idea that agents
have a set of priors was first suggested by Wald (1950) and Arrow (1951, pp. 429). We assume
that the set of priors is built by ε-contamination (as in, e.g., Epstein and Wang, 1994), around the
“true” probability p. An agent with such preferences considers p but also all probabilities q around
p given by (1 − ε)p ≤ q ≤ ε + p(1 − ε). In other words, people assign a confidence weight of
(1− ε) to p but also a weight ε to extreme possibilities 0 and 1. The parameter ε gives the size of
the set of priors. It is 0 for a singleton as under expected utility, and 1 if the agent considers the
whole interval [0, 1] and perceives full ambiguity. The objective function becomes:
max
e∈[0,e]
Ua(e) = δ min
q≤ε+(1−ε)p(e)
(qu(xb, hb; e) + (1− q)u(xg, hg; e))
+ (1− δ) max
q≥(1−ε)p(e)
(qu(xb, hb; e) + (1− q)u(xg, hg; e)) ,
(12)
with ε, δ ∈ (0, 1). As shown by Chateauneuf et al. (2007), this model is equivalent to neo-additive
weighting, with ε = α and δ = 1
2
− β
2α
. In this model, δ is traditionally interpreted as capturing
ambiguity aversion. The lower δ, the more weight on the worst case scenario. In the present setting,
the worst case scenario means that prevention efforts have little effect on the risk faced. Proposition
4 then implies that perceiving greater ambiguity about the costs and benefits of prevention increases
the amount of underprevention.
Corollary 1. Assume the objective function as defined in (12) with parameters ε, δ ∈ (0, 1). Then:
(i) The presence of ambiguity leads to less prevention for all pr.
(ii) An increase in ε leads to more underprevention.
(iii) A decrease in δ leads to less underprevention if and only if the marginal cost of effort is
higher in the bad state than in the good state.
Corollary 1 illustrates how ambiguity about the effect of prevention can decrease the perceived
benefits and reduce efforts. Statements (i) and (ii) are direct reformulations of the corresponding
statements in Proposition 4. Statement (iii) shows that more ambiguity aversion can reduce un-
derprevention if and only if efforts are more costly at the margin in the bad state than in the good
state. It is interesting to note that more perceived ambiguity (higher ε) increases the amount of
underprevention whereas more ambiguity aversion can reduce it.
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2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Related theoretical literature
One of the original motivations for prospect theory was people’s dislike of probabilistic insurance
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2006) derived that the effect of proba-
bility distortion on the willingness to pay to reduce health risks depends on the degree of likelihood
insensitivity and on the degree of pessimism. Their model is a special case of Eq. (3) where the
cost of effort is monetary and there are only two health states. Rheinberger et al. (2016) extended
Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt to three health states. Assuming linear utility for wealth Rheinberger
et al. (2016) showed that probability weighting leads to underprevention for the prevailing in-
cidence and mortality rates of severe diseases in the US. Their model also measures prevention
through willingness to pay and does not include a separate effort term. It is the special case of Eq.
(3) with three health states.
Etner and Jeleva (2014) defined the notion of fatalism, which is equivalent to w(p) ≤ p and
w′(p) ≤ 1 for all p ∈ (0, 1). They showed that fatalism is a sufficient condition for underpre-
vention. Their results do not apply to inverse S-shaped probability weighting, which are more
common empirically. Their utility specification does not include health and only admits a mon-
etary cost of effort. Their result of universal underprevention under fatalism also holds under
neo-additive probability weighting in our model. This shows that w′(p) < 1 is the crucial property
underlying fatalism, not w(p) ≤ p, which again highlights the role of likelihood insensitivity.
Snow (2011) and Alary et al. (2013) both studied the impact of ambiguity on prevention under
the two-stage smooth ambiguity model proposed by Klibanoff et al. (2005). Snow (2011) found
that ambiguity raises the optimal level of prevention for an ambiguity-averse agent, and that this
level increases with ambiguity aversion. He obtained a similar result with probability weighting but
considered only convex weighting functions. Alary et al. (2013) found that the effect of ambiguity
aversion on optimal prevention was indeterminate in a multi-state model of prevention.
2.5.2 Prevention and health risks
Keeney (2008) showed that smoking and obesity are the main causes of premature death caused
by bad personal decisions. Even though their proportion is decreasing smokers still make up
about a sixth of the U.S. population. In many developing countries the proportion of smokers
is still increasing.13 Keeney (2008) estimated that smoking causes roughly 450,000 deaths per
year in the US. Table 3, based on the data from Van Baal et al. (2006), shows the probabilities of
13The share of smokers in Egypt, for example, increased from 36% to 50% between 2000 and 2015 (World Health
Organization, 2018).
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Dutch infants born in 2006 to live to various ages. Smoking reduces individual life expectancy
significantly. Taking 70 as the expected retirement age for this cohort, the effort of not smoking
reduces the probability of dying before retirement by 16 percentage points for men and by 10
percentage points for women. The reduction in mortality risk is even more pronounced at later
ages.
Age
Healthy Smoking Obese
Men Women Men Women Men Women
70 89.46% 92.27% 72.78% 82.27% 79.67% 84.90%
75 81.89% 87.29% 58.09% 72.08% 67.90% 76.69%
80 69.03% 78.29% 39.59% 57.15% 51.74% 64.14%
Table 3: Probability of living to retirement (and 5 and 10 years into it) by behavioral type. Table
based on the analysis of Van Baal et al. (2006).
Smoking also leads to significant increases in the likelihood of bad health. The probability of
being diagnosed with cancer in one’s life is 56% for male and 62% for female smokers in the US
compared to 36% and 33% for non-smokers.14 While not all cancers lead to death, treatment is
usually painful and leads to a substantial decrease in quality of life.
Unlike smoking, obesity is a growing health concern and tripled worldwide between 1975 and
2016 (World Health Organization, 2018). In the US more than one third (36.5%) of adults and 17%
of youth were obese in 2014 (Ogden et al., 2015). Obesity increases the risk of severe diseases
(e.g. heart conditions, stroke, diabetes and types of cancer), and therefore also increases mortality
risk. Table 3 shows that obesity increases the probability of dying before retirement by roughly
10 percentage points. Similarly, the likelihood of coronary heart disease increases by almost 12
percentage points for obese individuals.15 The benefits from prevention efforts such as a healthier
diet and increased physical activity are thus large.
Individuals’ choices depend on their circumstances and preferences. The decision to prevent
premature death, as every other prevention decision, involves a (personal) trade-off between costs
and potential benefits. However, given the sizable benefits of at least 10 expected life-years, it is
puzzling why simple steps such as eating healthier or smoking less are not taken. Our analysis
provides an answer. Because the above probabilities probably lie in the underprevention region,
probability distortion is a plausible explanation why many people do not undertake such preventive
actions.
Many strategies can prevent people from falling ill and underprevention holds for many of
14We calculated these probabilities using multiple data sources. See Appendix ?? for details.
15Own calculations based on the baseline probability provided in Mozaffarian et al. (2015), the relative risk given
in Lhachimi et al. (2012) and the obesity prevalence reported by Ogden et al. (2015).
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them. Up to one half of the patients fail to comply with their treatment schedule (Wright, 1993)
risking even worse outcomes than their current health state. In all these examples the preventive
effort is not monetary justifying our approach of modeling effort as a separate variable.
Our results help to improve the efficacy of prevention policies. For instance, they suggest that
solely communicating the benefits of prevention may have little impact if the risk reduction occurs
in the insensitivity region. This region is larger and insensitivity is higher if people are unfamiliar
with the risks or if they perceive them as ambiguous (Tversky and Fox, 1995; Abdellaoui et al.,
2011). Effective policies should try to reduce likelihood insensitivity by giving precise information
about the risks involved. Additionally, governments may consider different ways of communicat-
ing the risks. For example, Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) showed that people find frequencies
easier to handle than probabilities and behave more like Bayesians for frequencies.
2.5.3 Other application domains
The model presented in this paper can shed light on other situations in which efforts can reduce
future risks. An example is education. Today’s generation has a 50% chance of not reaching
their parents’ real income (Chetty et al., 2017). A university degree, particularly in subjects like
Computer Science and Natural Sciences increases expected future earnings and thus decreases the
probability of falling short of parents’ lifestyle. In 2015, the probability of ending up in the upper
50 percentile of the US income distribution was around 65% for college graduates against 36%
for high school graduates.16,17 It is thus surprising why not more young adults strive for a college
education. Our results suggest that this may be because the probability of falling short of parents’
lifestyle lies in the insensitivity region and probability weighting blurs the perceived benefits of
higher education.
Climate change is arguably the most important risk society faces today. In a survey by ComRes
on behalf of Global Challenges Foundation (2017) with around 8,000 participants from around
the world, 84% of the participants considered climate change as a global catastrophic risk and
88% were willing to change their current living standards to prevent it. Still prevention efforts at
the individual and societal level are limited at best (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
2013). One reason is the considerable ambiguity about the extent and effects of climate change
and the effectiveness of the measures taken against it (Berger et al., 2016). Our results suggest that
this ambiguity leads to more likelihood insensitivity and thus to more underprevention.
16Source: OECD, data obtained from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EAG_
EARNINGS#.
17Other factors, like parents’ income and education, also play a role in the prospects of young adults (Chetty et al.,
2014), but the positive effects of college education on future income, particularly in a technical field, are widely
accepted (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
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2.5.4 Empirical evidence and predictions
In our model, the cost of effort can be monetary, non-monetary or a combination of both. Using
the model for predictions might require a quantification of this cost. When it is monetary, such
quantifications are often readily available on the market. The empirical literature has shown that
monetary costs indeed play a role in individuals’ prevention decisions. Cohen and Dupas (2010)
used a field experiment manipulating the cost of mosquito nets as a protection against malaria.
They showed that a decrease from 100% to 90% of the subsidy for mosquito nets decreases uptake
by 60 percentage points. In a large randomized field experiment in the United States, Finkelstein
et al. (2012) find that the provision of health insurance coverage markedly increased the utiliza-
tion of preventive medical services, such as blood cholesterol measurements or mammographies.
Regarding non-monetary effort, empirical quantifications are more difficult, but still possible. Mul-
lahy (1999), for example, studied the time cost of flu shots and found that working people have a
higher opportunity cost (larger impact of e on u) than non-working people, but that they also have
more to gain from flu shots (larger utility difference between good state and bad state).
Our model features both monetary and health consequences. It is a current debate how prob-
ability weighting is impacted by the nature of the considered consequences. Most empirical evi-
dence on probability weighting concerns monetary outcomes and some health outcomes but very
few studies compare weighting functions across domains. Wakker and Deneffe (1996) provided
indirect evidence of stronger deviations from expected utility for life-duration than for money. Rot-
tenstreich and Hsee (2001) showed that affect-rich outcomes can amplify likelihood insensitivity.
Abdellaoui and Kemel (2013) compared winning and losing money with saving and losing time.
Time as an outcome yielded more insensitivity and more elevation than money. The insensitivity
region for time was especially large. Kemel and Paraschiv (2018) found less elevated weighting
functions when outcomes are human lives than when outcomes are monetary. Other factors influ-
ence probability weighting. Identifying them provides directions to design interventions targeting
those who are more prone to underprevention. Age (Booij et al., 2010), gender (Fehr-Duda et al.,
2010), affective states (Kliger and Levy, 2008) and numeracy (Petrova et al., 2014) have been
linked to the extent to which probability weighting appears. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) show that the
amount of likelihood insensitivity varies with the familiarity that agents have with the risk. Since
probability insensitivity tends to favor underprevention, we can thus speculate that underprevention
is a larger problem for risks with which agents are unfamiliar.
These results offer several avenues for designing more effective policy interventions to increase
prevention efforts in society. Since numeracy and familiarity are negatively associated with the
degree of likelihood insensitivity, one way forward could be to make agents more familiar with
the risks they are facing. Such interventions would reduce ambiguity and increase subject specific
numeracy (often measured by concepts such as financial or technological literacy) and would thus
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likely reduce underprevention, as well. Specific examples come to mind. In health applications,
using certain graphical displays fosters understanding of the risk and increases decision quality
(Fagerlin et al., 2005; Smerecnik et al., 2010). In the education example, high school students could
be confronted with specific information about the employment opportunities of different careers.
Combining our results with those by Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) and Kliger and Levy (2008)
further renders potential guidance on how public information campaigns about prevention should
be designed. In such campaigns, information is often communicated in very affect-rich contexts.
An example for this are the graphic displays on cigarette cartons mandatory in the European Union.
The result that more affect-rich environments lead to more likelihood insensitivity and thus by our
model to less prevention, might call the efficiency of such campaigns into question.
Our model focuses on probability weighting to understand underprevention but alternative ex-
planations exist, such as time preferences. Future benefits from prevention should be discounted
but an agent prone to present bias may exert even less effort by applying an additional penalty to
any future utility. Such present bias can lead to procrastination, with agents planning prevention
but not following through. Empirical studies are needed to disentangle the effect of time prefer-
ences from the effect of risk perception on prevention. Such studies could involve eliciting time
and risk preferences and subsequently monitoring agents in their prevention behavior. Alterna-
tively, interventions could be designed to target probability weighting or the present bias and they
could be compared in an experiment. For instance, an intervention to make agents more familiar
with some risks could be compared with an intervention proposing commitment devices to help
people carry out their prevention plans.
2.6 Conclusion
The anomalies in insurance and financial markets led Arrow (1982) to the conclusion that “sys-
tematic deviations from individual rational behavior [...] are consonant with evidence from very
different sources collected by psychologists.” Following his example, we showed that low preven-
tion efforts are consonant with the evidence collected on risk perception and probability weighting.
Likelihood insensitivity and ambiguity blur the benefits of prevention, inducing agents to exert less
effort than their rational counterparts would. Probability weighting can thus contribute to explain
the puzzle put forward by Keeney (2008), that agents’ own decisions are so often responsible
for their own death. Our theoretical model enables us to identify when and how people behave
suboptimally, making it possible to improve the efficacy of prevention policies.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs for Section 3
2.A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Define f(p) = w(p) − p, which is continuous on [0, 1] and twice differentiable on (0, 1) due to
the regularity of w. We know that f(0) = f(p∗) = f(1) = 0 from Definition 1 and Property
(i) in Definition 2. From Rolle’s Theorem we obtain p1 ∈ (0, p∗) and p2 ∈ (p∗, 1) such that
f ′(pi) = w′(pi) − 1 = 0 for pi ∈ {p1, p2}. So f ′(p) has at least two zeros on (0, 1). From the
inverse S shape of w(p) we can infer that f ′′(p) = w′′(p) is negative for p < p˜, zero for p = p˜
and positive for p > p˜. Hence, f ′(p) is strictly decreasing at first, has a minimum at p = p˜ and is
strictly increasing thereafter. Consequently, f ′(p) can have no more than two zeros, and one is to
the left of p˜ and the other one to the right of p˜. It follows that w′(p) > 1 for p ∈ (0, p1) ∪ (p2, 1),
w′(pi) = 1 for pi ∈ {p1, p2} and w′(p) < 1 for p ∈ (p1, p2).
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Inserting the rational agent’s optimal level of prevention er into the first-order expression under
probability weighting yields:
Uwe (e
r) = −w′(pr)p′(er) [u(xg, hg; er)− u(xb, hb; er)] (13)
+ [w(pr)ue(xb, hb; e
r) + (1− w(pr))ue(xg, hg; er)]
= −w′(pr) [prue(xb, hb; er) + (1− pr)ue(xg, hg; er)] (14)
+ [w(pr)ue(xb, hb; e
r) + (1− w(pr))ue(xg, hg; er)]
= [1− w′(pr)] [prue(xb, hb; er) + (1− pr)ue(xg, hg; er)] (15)
+ [w(pr)− pr] [ue(xb, hb; er)− ue(xg, hg; er)] .
The second equality holds due to the FOC for er, see Eq. (2), and the third one is a simple
rearrangement.
We investigate the last expression as a funtion of pr and denote it by g(pr) while keeping all
other parameters fixed. To determine the behavior of g as pr approaches the endpoints of the unit
interval, we first notice that w′ is not necessarily defined at 0 and 1. However, it follows from the
inverse-S shape of w that w′ either converges to a limit above 1 or diverges to +∞ as pr approaches
0 or 1.18 We denote these limits by w′(0) and w′(1), taking into account that they may be infinite.
18Look at the sequence {w′(1/n)} for n ≥ 1/p1 for example; each element exceeds 1 and the sequence is mono-
tonically increasing due to concavity of w on (0, p˜). If it is bounded, the monotone convergence theorem establishes
the existence of a limit above 1, if it is unbounded, it diverges to +∞. A similar argument applies to pr → 1.
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Then, it holds that
lim
pr→0
g(pr) = [1− w′(0)]ue(xg, hg; er) > 0 and (16)
lim
pr→1
g(pr) = [1− w′(1)]ue(xb, hb; er) > 0, (17)
where both limits are potentially infinite if w′(0) and w′(1) are. From the regularity of w it follows
that g is a differentiable function on (0, 1). Its derivative with respect to pr is given by
g′(pr) = −w′′(pr) [prue(xb, hb; er) + (1− pr)ue(xg, hg; er)] , (18)
which is negative for pr < p˜, zero for pr = p˜ and positive for pr > p˜. As a result, g as a function
of pr is strictly decreasing at first, has a minimum at pr = p˜ and is strictly increasing thereafter.
Additionally, it holds that
g(p∗) = [1− w′(p∗)] [prue(xb, hb; er) + (1− pr)ue(xg, hg; er)] < 0, (19)
because w(p∗) = p∗ per definition and because p∗ lies inside the likelihood insensitivity region
per Lemma 1. This implies that g(p˜) ≤ g(p∗) < 0 since p˜ is the global minimizer of g on (0, 1).
All these properties together with the continuity of g ensure the existence of exactly two zeros in
(0, 1), denoted by p and p, with one of them being smaller than p∗ and p˜, and the other one being
larger than p∗ and p˜.
So if pr ∈ (p, p), we obtain g(pr) = Uwe (er) < 0 so that probability weighting induces the
agent to choose a lower level of prevention than the rational agent, ew < er. If, however, pr ∈
(0, p) ∪ (p, 1), we obtain g(pr) = Uwe (er) > 0, and probability weighting induces the agent to
choose a higher level of prevention than the rational agent, ew > er. Notice that the assumption of
Uw being concave in e is critical in this last step.
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We evaluate g(pr) at p1 and p2, taking into account that w′(pi) = 1 for i = 1, 2. It holds that
g(p1) = [w(p1)− p1] [ue(xb, hb; er)− ue(xg, hg; er)] , (20)
where the first bracket is positive because p1 < p∗ from Lemma 1. The second bracket is negative
(zero, positive) if the marginal cost of effort is smaller (identical, larger) in the good state compared
to the bad state.19 Then, it holds that g(p1) < (=, >) g(p), and g is decreasing for probabilities
19Effort lowers utility, ue < 0, so an appropriate measure of the marginal cost of effort is given by |ue| = −ue.
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less than p˜ so that p < (=, >) p1.
Similarly, we obtain that
g(p2) = [w(p2)− p2] [ue(xb, hb; er)− ue(xg, hg; er)] , (21)
where the first bracket is negative because p2 > p∗ from Lemma 1. The second bracket is negative
(zero, positive) if the marginal cost of effort is smaller (identical, larger) in the good state compared
to the bad state. Then, it holds that g(p2) > (=, <) g(p), and g is increasing for probabilities
above p˜ so that p < (=, >) p2.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof proceeds in several steps, and to increase readability, we will formulate some of these
steps as separate Lemmas. The boundaries of the underprevention region, p and p, are obtained as
the solution of g(pr) = 0. Rearranging this condition yields:
(1− w(pr))− w′(pr)(1− pr)
w′(pr)pr − w(pr) =
ue(xb, hb; e
r)
ue(xg, hg; er)
= κ. (22)
We denote the left-hand side of (22) by h(pr) and will first characterize its behavior on [0, 1] when
w is a regular inverse S-shaped probability weighting function.
Lemma 2. h has the following properties:
(i) A unique zero at some q1 ∈ (p1,min{p∗, p˜}).
(ii) A singularity at some q2 ∈ (max{p∗, p˜}, p2) with limpr↑q2 h(pr) = −∞ and limpr↓q2 h(pr) =
∞.
(iii) limpr→0 h(pr) =∞ and limpr→1 h(pr) = 0.
(iv) It is positive for pr ∈ (0, q1) ∪ (q2, 1) and negative for pr ∈ (q1, q2).
(v) It is decreasing for pr ∈ (0,min{p∗, p˜}) ∪ (max{p∗, p˜}, q2) ∪ (q2, 1) and increasing for
pr ∈ (min{p∗, p˜},max{p∗, p˜}).
Proof. We denote by hn(pr) the numerator of h and by hd(pr) its denominator, that is h(pr) =
hn(p
r)/hd(p
r). It holds that limpr→0 hn(pr) = 1−w′(0) < 0, potentially−∞, limpr→1 hn(pr) = 0
and h′n(p
r) = −w′′(pr)(1−pr) so that hn is strictly increasing for pr < p˜, has a maximum at pr = p˜,
and is strictly decreasing for pr > p˜. This proves the existence of a unique zero q1 < p˜ of hn and
therefore of h. hn(p1) = p1 − w(p1) < 0 so that q1 > p1, and hn(p∗) = (1− p∗)(1− w′(p∗)) > 0
so that q1 < p∗. This proves (i).
2.A PROOFS FOR SECTION 3 65
For the denominator it holds that limpr→0 hd(pr) = 0, limpr→1 hd(pr) = w′(1) − 1 > 0,
potentially∞, and h′d(pr) = w′′(pr)pr so that hd is strictly decreasing for pr < p˜ has a minimum
at pr = p˜ and is strictly increasing for pr > p˜. This proves the existence of a unique zero q2 > p˜
of hd, which is a singularity of h. hd(p∗) = p∗(w′(p∗) − 1) < 0 so that q2 > p∗ and hd(p2) =
p2 − w(p2) > 0 so that q2 < p2. Furthermore, hn(q2) = 1− w′(q2) > 0 by definition of q2, which
shows that h switches from −∞ to +∞ at q2. This proves (ii).
The limits of h for pr → 0 and pr → 1 follow from the limits of the numerator and the
denominator at 0 and 1. Notice that hd(pr) approaches 0 from below for pr → 0. This shows (iii).
The signs of h follow from the signs of hn and hd according to the following table, which
demonstrates (iv).
pr (0, q1) (q1, q2) (q2, 1)
hn − + +
hd − − +
hn/hd + − +
Table 4: Signs of hn, hd and hn/hd
The derivative of h with respect to pr is given by
h′(pr) =
w′′(pr) [w(pr)− pr]
[w′(pr)pr − w(pr)]2 , (23)
and (v) follows immediately.
Figure 4 illustrates h as a function of pr for a Prelec-2 probability weighting function with
parameters α = 0.5 and β = 1.2. The properties established in Lemma 2 imply that any positive
value of κ renders two solutions to Eq. (22), p and p, one smaller than p∗ and p˜ and one larger than
p∗ and p˜ consistent with Proposition 1. Given that h is decreasing whenever it is positive, both p
and p are negatively associated with κ, which shows claim (i) in Proposition 3.
To prove statements (ii) to (v), we first analyze how the rational agent’s optimal level of pre-
vention depends on xg, xb, hg and hb, and then proceed to show how changes in the exogenous
parameters affect the ratio of the marginal cost of effort in the bad state over the marginal cost of
effort in the good state, i.e., how κ is affected. Signing the effect on κ will then render the effect
on the underprevention region via statement (i) of Proposition 3.
Lemma 3. Assume uxe ≥ 0 and ue(x, hg; e) ≥ ue(x, hb; e). The rational agent’s optimal level of
prevention is:
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Figure 4: Shape of h as a function of pr
a) Increasing in xg.
b) Decreasing in xb if the loss probability is more elastic than the marginal utility of wealth.
c) Increasing in hg.
d) Decreasing in hb if the loss probability is more elastic than the utility gain from better health.
Proof. We first show a) and b). Our assumption of er being an interior solution yields U ree(e
r) <
0 for maximality. Per the implicit function rule, exogenous changes affect the optimal level of
prevention according to
der
dk
= −U
r
ke(e
r)
U ree(e
r)
, k ∈ {xg, xb}, (24)
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so that sgn(de
r
dk
) = sgn(U rke(e
r)). The relevant cross-derivatives are given by
U rxge(e
r) = −p′(er)ux(xg, hg; er) + (1− p(er))uxe(xg, hg; er) > 0 (25)
and
U rxbe(e
r) = p′(er)ux(xb, hb; er) + p(er)uxe(xb, hb; er) (26)
=
1
er
p(er)ux(xb, hb; e
r) · [εux(xg, hg; er)− εp(er)] < 0, (27)
where the signs follow from our assumptions. To demonstrate c) and d), we assume a change in
health from hg to hˆg with hˆg  hg and a change in health from hb to hˆb with hg  hˆb  hb. If er
denotes the rational agent’s optimal level of prevention when health outcomes are hg and hb, we
obtain that
−p′(er)
[
u(xg, hˆg; e
r)− u(xb, hb; er)
]
+
[
p(er)ue(xb, hb; e
r) + (1− p(er))ue(xg, hˆg; er)
]
(28)
= −p′(er)
[
u(xg, hˆg; e
r)− u(xg, hg; er)
]
+ (1− p(er))
[
ue(xg, hˆg; e
r)− ue(xg, hg; er)
]
> 0,(29)
where the equality holds by the FOC for er, see Eq. (2), and the sign follows from our assumptions.
As a result, when the good health outcome improves from hg to hˆg, the effort level er is no longer
enough and the rational agent would increase it in response. Similarly, it holds that
−p′(er)
[
u(xg, hg; e
r)− u(xb, hˆb; er)
]
+
[
p(er)ue(xb, hˆb; e
r) + (1− p(er))ue(xg, hg; er)
]
(30)
= −p′(er)
[
u(xb, hb; e
r)− u(xb, hˆb; er)
]
+ pr
[
u(xb, hˆb; e
r)− u(xb, hb; er)
]
(31)
=
1
er
pr
[
u(xb, hˆb; e
r)− u(xb, hb; er)
]
·
[
ε∆h(xb, hˆb, hb; e
r)− εp(er)
]
< 0, (32)
where the equality holds by the FOC for er, see Eq. (2), and the sign follows from our assumptions.
Hence, when the bad health outcome improves from hb to hˆb, while maintaining its interpretation
of being worse health than hg, the effort level er is too high and the rational agent decreases it in
response.
To complete the proof of statements (ii) to (v) of Proposition 3, we need to determine the effect
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of changes in xg, xb, hg and hb on κ in Eq. (22). It holds that
dκ
dxg
=
ue(xg, hg; e
r)uee(xb, hb; e
r) de
r
dxg
− ue(xb, hb; er)
[
uee(xg, hg; e
r) de
r
dxg
+ uxe(xg, hg; e
r)
]
ue(xg, hg; er)2
(33)
=
ue(xb, hb; e
r)
er · ue(xg, hg; er) [εue(xb, hb; e
r)− εue(xg, hg; er)]
der
dxg
− ue(xb, hb; e
r)uxe(xg, hg; e
r)
ue(xg, hg; er)2
≥ 0,
(34)
using the assumptions stated in Proposition 3 and the result in Lemma 3a). So an increase in
xg increases κ, in which case the underprevention region shifts to the left per Proposition 3(i).
Likewise, we obtain that
dκ
dxb
=
ue(xb, hb; e
r)
er · ue(xg, hg; er) [εue(xb, hb; e
r)− εue(xg, hg; er)]
der
dxb
+
uxe(xg, hg; e
r)
ue(xg, hg; er)
≤ 0, (35)
from the assumptions in Proposition 3 and Lemma 3b). An increase in xb lowers κ so that the un-
derprevention region shifts to the right due to Proposition 3(i). If health in the good state improves
from hg to hˆg, this results in an increase of the rational agent’s optimal effort level from er to eˆr,
and as a result
ue(xb, hb; e
r)
ue(xg, hg; er)
≤ ue(xb, hb; eˆ
r)
ue(xg, hg; eˆr)
≤ ue(xb, hb; eˆ
r)
ue(xg, hˆg; eˆr)
. (36)
The first inequality holds because the marginal cost of effort is assumed to be more elastic in the
bad than the good state, and the second one is a consequence of our assumption that an improve-
ment in health reduces the marginal cost of effort. So κ increases when health improves from hg
to hˆg, which shifts the underprevention region to the left per Proposition 3(i). Finally, when health
in the bad state improves from hb to hˆb with associated effort levels er and eˆr, arguments that are
by now familiar establish that
ue(xb, hb; e
r)
ue(xg, hg; er)
≥ ue(xb, hb; eˆ
r)
ue(xg, hg; eˆr)
≥ ue(xb, hb; eˆ
r)
ue(xg, hˆg; eˆr)
(37)
under the assumptions made. So κ decreases, which shifts the underprevention region to the right
per Proposition 3(i).
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2.A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We evaluate the agent’s first-order expression when his probability weighting function is neo-
additive at the rational agent’s optimal level of prevention er. This yields
Uwe (e
r) = −(1− α)p′(er) [u(xg, hg; er)− u(xb, hb; er)] (38)
+
[(
α− β
2
+ (1− α)pr
)
ue(xb, hb; e
r) +
(
1− α− β
2
− (1− α)pr
)
ue(xg, hg; e
r)
]
= −(1− α) [prue(xb, hb; er) + (1− pr)ue(xg, hg; er)] (39)
+
[(
α− β
2
+ (1− α)pr
)
ue(xb, hb; e
r) +
(
1− α− β
2
− (1− α)pr
)
ue(xg, hg; e
r)
]
=
α− β
2
ue(xb, hb; e
r) +
α + β
2
ue(xg, hg; e
r), (40)
where the first equality follows from the definition of the neo-additive probability weighting func-
tion, the second by substituting from the FOC for er in Eq. (2), and the third one by combinining
and simplifying terms. The parameters in the neo-additive probability weighting function are such
that (α−β) > 0 and (α+β) > 0 so that Uwe (er) < 0, which shows that the agent with neo-additive
probability weighting chooses a lower level of prevention than the rational agent (claim (i)).
For (ii) and (iii) we differentiate the agent’s first-order condition with respect to α and β,
respectively, and determine the sign. We obtain
∂Uwe (e
w)
∂α
= p′(ew) [u(xg, hg; ew)− u(xb, hb; ew)] (41)
+
[(
1
2
− pw
)
ue(xb, hb; e
w)−
(
1
2
− pw
)
ue(xg, hg; e
w)
]
=
1
1− α
[(
α− β
2
+ (1− α)pw
)
ue(xb, hb; e
w) +
(
1− α− β
2
− (1− α)pw
)
ue(xg, hg; e
w)
]
+
(
1
2
− pw
)
[ue(xb, hb; e
w)− ue(xg, hg; ew)] (42)
=
1
2(1− α) [(1− β)ue(xb, hb; e
w) + (1 + β)ue(xg, hg; e
w)] , (43)
where the second equality follows from substituting in the FOC for ew, see Eq. (4), and the third
one by rearranging and combining terms. The parameters in the neo-additive weighting function
are such that (1− α) > 0, (1− β) > 0 and (1 + β) > 0 so that ∂Uwe (ew)/∂α < 0. An increase in
parameter α reduces ew. Finally, we determine
∂Uwe (e
w)
∂β
= −1
2
[ue(xb, hb; e
w)− ue(xg, hg; ew)] , (44)
which is negative (zero, positive) if and only if −ue(xb, hb; ew) exceeds (is equal to, falls below)
−ue(xg, hg; ew).
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2.A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Statements (i) and (ii) are direct reformulations of (i) and (ii) from Proposition 4. For (iii), we first
notice α−β
2
= δε and α+β
2
= (1− δ)ε. Hence,
Uwe (e
w) = δεue(xb, hb; e
w) + (1− δ)εue(xg, hg; ew). (45)
We then differentiate the agent’s first-order condition with respect to δ and obtain
∂Uwe (e
w)
∂δ
= ε [ue(xb, hb; e
w)− ue(xg, hg; ew)] , (46)
which is positive (zero, negative) if and only if −ue(xb, hb; ew) exceeds (is equal to, falls below)
−ue(xg, hg; ew).
Appendix 2.B Evidence of likelihood insensitivity regions
Tables 5 and 6 display the insensitivity regions calculated from the results of prior experimental
studies. Table 5 is based on the parameter estimates of a Prelec-2 function by l’Haridon and Vieider
(2018) 29 individual countries.
Table 6 uses the results from several different studies that estimate parameter values for com-
monly used probability weighting functions. We compute the insensitivity regions corresponding
to the chosen probability weighting function at the reported point estimates.
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Table 5: Insensivity Regions for several countries
Country Insensitivity region Unit interval
Australia 12.43% - 88.34%
Belgium 11.39% - 86.10%
Brazil 13.02% - 85.96%
Cambodia 3.70% - 85.11%
Chile 11.02% - 87.07%
China 10.95% - 85.44%
Colombia 8.98% - 80.85%
Costarica 8.34% - 81.20%
Czech 15.40% - 88.44%
Ethiopia 5.67% - 85.02%
France 12.23% - 84.40%
Germany 11.98% - 84.51%
India 4.77% - 82.19%
Japan 14.41% - 86.23%
Kyrgyzstan 6.26% - 83.49%
Malaysia 8.95% - 85.99%
Nicaragua 5.31% - 85.55%
Nigeria 2.67% - 91.44%
Peru 6.95% - 84.94%
Poland 9.35% - 81.16%
Russia 7.12% - 78.45%
Saudi 9.52% - 85.28%
South Africa 8.00% - 81.03%
Spain 12.52% - 86.02%
Thailand 7.95% - 75.85%
Tunisia 6.09% - 85.60%
UK 6.05% - 82.05%
USA 12.62% - 84.13%
Vietnam 9.00% - 81.82%
Global 7.69% - 84.43%
Insensitivity regions are calculated using the two-parameter Prelec function as estimated in l’Haridon and Vieider
(2018). Guatemala is removed from the list since the weighting function was not inverse S-shaped. The last column
represents the insensitivity regions as bars in the unit interval.
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Table 6: Estimates of the insensitivity region based on empirical results
Weighting function Study Domain Insensitivity region Unit interval
TK Tversky and Kahneman (1992) Loss 10.52% - 83.69%
w(p) = p
α
[pα+(1−p)α] 1α
Abdellaoui (2000) Loss 10.77% - 83.61%
Etchart-Vincent (2004) Loss 15.23% - 82.58%
Andersen et al. (2006) Combined 12.22% - 83.17%
Berns et al. (2007) Loss 10.40% - 83.74%
Etchart-Vincent (2009) Loss 12.22% - 83.17%
Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2009) Combined 15.67% - 82.53%
Kemel and Paraschiv (2013) Loss 10.28% - 83.78%
GE Abdellaoui (2000) Loss 10.19% - 84.25%
w(p) = βp
α
βpα+(1−p)α Etchart-Vincent (2004) Loss 19.90% - 88.63%
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) Loss 26.40% - 95.61%
Fehr-Duda et al. (2006) Loss 11.84% - 89.47%
Etchart-Vincent (2009) Loss 14.65% - 89.21%
Booij et al. (2010) Loss 12.47% - 88.08%
Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) Loss 8.80% - 90.62%
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) Loss 8.45% - 80.51%
Abdellaoui and Kemel (2013) Loss 11.26% - 86.07%
Prelec-1 Donkers et al. (2001) Combined 4.45% - 87.07%
w(p) = exp(−(− ln p)α) Tu et al. (2005) Loss 8.29% - 80.59%
Tanaka et al. (2010) Loss 7.96% - 81.08%
Charupat et al. (2013) Loss 7.67% - 81.55%
Kemel and Paraschiv (2013) Loss 9.61% - 78.64%
Wibbenmeyer et al. (2013) Loss 1.74% - 93.24%
Prelec-2 Booij et al. (2010) Loss 8.86% - 86.39%
w(p) = exp(−β(− ln p)α) Abdellaoui and Kemel (2013) Loss 6.50% - 83.42%
Charupat et al. (2013) Loss 6.56% - 81.21%
“Loss” and “Combined” indicate that the study elicited parameter values for losses or for both losses and gains assuming they are equal, respectively.
The last column represents the insensitivity regions as bars in the unit interval.
Appendix 2.C Calculation of conditional cancer incidence prob-
abilities in Section 5.2
We aim to calculate the lifetime probability of being diagnosed with any type of cancer conditional
on the individual’s smoking status. We denote the smoking status as S if the individual is a smoker
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and as ¬S for a non-smoker20. We use the taxonomy from Howlader et al. (2017) to distinguish
between 23 different types of cancer Ci with unconditional incidence rate P (Ci), i ∈ {1, ..., 23}.
P (CΣ) denotes the probability of being diagnosed with any type of cancer. Smoking affects 12
types of cancer by a relative risk ratio of pii (see Surgeon General, 2014) such that
P (Ci|S) = piiP (Ci|¬S). (47)
Using the law of total probability, this becomes
P (Ci|S) = piiP (Ci)− P (Ci|S)P (S)
P (¬S) . (48)
Solving for P (Ci|S) then yields
P (Ci|S) = piiP (Ci)
P (¬S) + piiP (S) , (49)
to which we know all inputs. P (Ci|¬S) can then be calculated through the law of total probability.
Data from Howlader et al. (2017) informs us that cancer incidents are neither stochastically in-
dependent nor mutually exclusive so that neither P (¬CΣ) =
∏23
i=1 P (¬Ci) nor P (CΣ) =
∑23
i=1 P (Ci)
holds. To aggregate cancer-specific incidence rates, we make two simplifying assumptions. First,
we assume all types of cancer to be pairwise correlated with the same correlation coefficient ρ.
Second, we assume that an individual cannot be diagnosed with more than two types of cancer.
The latter assumption is certainly incorrect, but since the incidence rates are small, the associated
bias is small enough to make it acceptable. Based on these assumptions, we find that
P (CΣ|S) =
23∑
i=1
P (Ci|S)−
∑
1≤i<j≤23
P (Ci ∩ Cj|S) (50)
where
P (Ci ∩ Cj|S) = ρ
√
P (Ci|S)(1− P (Ci|S))P (Cj|S)(1− P (Cj|S)) + P (Ci|S)P (Cj|S) (51)
from the definition of the correlation coefficient. We calibrate the missing input factor ρ such as to
solve Eq. (50) for the unconditional probabilities provided by Howlader et al. (2017).
The calculations are carried out for women and men separately. All inputs are given in Table
20The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services use a more granular codification, see https:
//www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/
downloads/9_Record_Smoking_Status.pdf. We choose a binary distinction for smoking status for
reasons of data availability.
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7. Smoking prevalence, lifetime cancer incidence rates, and relative risk ratios pertain to the year
2014. Calculations on the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Survey data of the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (2015) were carried out using weighted sampling to make the
sample representative.
Table 7: Input Parameters and Sources
Input Description Male Female Reference
P (S) Probability of smoking 19.26% 15.25% Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (2015)
P (CΣ) Incidence Rate (IR) all cancer 39.66% 37.65% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C1) IR Bladder (includes in situ) 3.76% 1.12% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C2) IR Brain and nervous system 0.70% 0.54% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C3) IR Breast 0.12% 12.41% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C4) IR Cervix 0.62% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C5) IR Colon and rectum 4.49% 4.15% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C6) IR Esophagus 0.76% 0.22% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C7) IR Hodgkin disease 0.23% 0.19% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C8) IR Kidney and renal pelvis 2.09% 1.20% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C9) IR Larynx (voice box) 0.55% 0.12% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C10) IR Leukemia 1.79% 1.26% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C11) IR Liver and bile duct 1.39% 0.60% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C12) IR Lung and bronchus 6.85% 5.95% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C13) IR Melanoma of the skin 2.77% 1.72% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C14) IR Multiple myeloma 0.89% 0.65% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C15) IR Non-Hodgkin lymphoma 2.38% 1.87% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C16) IR Oral cavity and pharynx 1.61% 0.68% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C17) IR Ovary 1.27% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C18) IR Pancreas 1.58% 1.54% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C19) IR Prostate 11.55% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C20) IR Stomach 1.05% 0.65% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C21) IR Testicles 0.40% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C22) IR Thyroid 0.63% 1.79% Howlader et al. (2017)
P (C23) IR Uterine corpus 2.85% Howlader et al. (2017)
pi1 Relative risk of C1 2.8 2.73 Gandini et al. (2008),
indicated there as lower
urinary tract
pi4 Relative risk of C4 1.83 Gandini et al. (2008)
pi5 Relative risk of C5 1 1 Evidence in the literature is
mixed. Assumed 1.
pi6 Relative risk of C6 2.52 2.28 Gandini et al. (2008)
pi8 Relative risk of C8 1.59 1.35 Gandini et al. (2008)
pi9 Relative risk of C9 6.98 6.98 Gandini et al. (2008), no
analysis by gender reported
Continued on next page
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Input Parameters and Sources (continued)
Input Description Male Female Reference
pi11 Relative risk of C11 1.85 1.49 Gandini et al. (2008)
pi12 Relative risk of C12 9.87 7.58 Gandini et al. (2008)
pi16 Relative risk of C16 5.1 5.1 Gandini et al. (2008), no
analysis by gender reported
pi18 Relative risk of C18 1.63 1.73 Gandini et al. (2008)
pi20 Relative risk of C20 1.64 1.64 Gandini et al. (2008), no
analysis by gender reported
pi23 Relative risk of C23 2 Sasco et al. (2004)
Chapter 3
Informing, simulating experience, or both:
A field experiment on phishing risks∗
Joint with
Aure´lien Baillon, Jeroen de Bruin, Evelien van de Veer, and Bram van Dijk
3.1 Introduction
Phishing attacks, the attempt to deceptively acquire personal and/or financial information (user-
names, passwords etc.) by electronic communication, pose a significant threat for organizations.
Social networks are increasingly used in phishing attacks but phishing by emails remains the main
risk in an organizational setting. This is due to the relative simplicity of designing and send-
ing phishing emails and its potential to reach many individuals at the same time. The text of a
phishing email mostly addresses the recipient with urgency cues, words that invoke feelings of
vulnerability or threat, in order to try to force the recipient to act immediately and impulsively.
These urgency cues are most deceitful, because they turn attention away from other cues that may
potentially help the receiver to recognize a phishing email (Vishwanath et al., 2011). Attackers
can also trick users into downloading malicious malware, after they click on a link embedded in
the email (Ramanathan and Wechsler, 2013). In recent years, phishing emails have evolved from
poorly-designed and untargeted texts into highly personalized and sophisticated messages, which
has made recipients more likely to believe that the content is expected and legitimate (Blythe et al.,
2011; Berghel, 2006).
In order to cope with increased information security threats and ensure information security,
organizations actively take technical security measures (Gupta et al., 2018). Although these protec-
tive mechanisms contribute to improved information security (Ransbotham and Mitra, 2009), it is
rarely enough to entirely rely on them (Bada et al., 2015). Organizations that deploy both technical
and non-technical protective means are likely to be more successful in protecting against infor-
mation security risks (Pahnila et al., 2007; Vroom and von Solms, 2004; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
∗Published as “ Baillon A., J. de Bruin, A. Emirmahmutoglu, E. van de Veer and B. van Dijk (2019). In-
forming, simulating experience, or both: A field experiment on phishing risks. PLoS ONE, 14(12): e0224216.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224216”
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Organizations create policies and procedures to ensure information security (Whitman and Mat-
tord, 2003). Although constructing policies and procedures is an essential outset, it is not enough to
make sure employees comply with them. Vulnerabilities of the human factor in information secu-
rity are usually ascribed to non-intentional behavior. Some may simply lack knowledge, skills and
abilities to protect themselves against threats, and to comply with existing policies (Albrechtsen,
2007).
Is it enough to increase knowledge by providing more information to employees or should
companies look for alternative approaches, letting employees experience (a simulated version of)
the threat? Cai and Song (2017) showed that insurance take-up increased after people played
an insurance game. In many cases, people who are victims of phishing fraud never realize that
they have been a victim of a phishing attempt or realize it too late, when the extremely negative
consequences occur. Letting employees experience (simulated) phishing fraud can complement
general information provision. It can make them more receptive to the information.
In a large field experiment, we studied the effect of information provision and experience in
reducing the phishing risks. Although existing studies have examined the impact of training and
simulation on susceptibility to phishing fraud (Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 2007, 2010;
Downs et al., 2006; Wright and Marett, 2010; Bowen et al., 2011; Burns et al., 2013), many stud-
ies involved role-play activities or lab experiments. In lab experiments, the possibility of phishing
email tends to be salient and day-to-day distractions, which increase phishing susceptibility in the
real world, are absent. Field experiments avoid these problems but are more difficult to organize.
A large-scale field experiment was conducted on students and staff of a university by Mohebzada
et al. (2012). The authors found that warnings about phishing risk were not sufficient to prevent
users from responding to phishing emails. Other field experiments have been conducted to study
the risk factors (Silic and Back, 2016; Halevi et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2018) and the effec-
tiveness of phishing exercises in organizations (Siadati et al., 2017) when phishing emails vary in
terms of persuasiveness.
Our experiment was conducted at the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, with more than
10,000 subjects who were unaware that they participated in such an experiment. We were thereby
able to avoid the many biases which arise in a laboratory experimental setting, and managed to
observe actual behavior in a setup that closely mirrors an actual phishing attack. Our experi-
ment consisted of a control and three treatments: information, experience, and both. Information
provision aimed at increasing (procedural) knowledge whereas simulated experience could make
employees more alert about the threat and more receptive to information. Many authors have ar-
gued that combining information and simulated experience leads to stronger effects (Bowen et al.,
2011; Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Burns et al., 2013; Sheng et al., 2007). Our experimental design
allowed us to test for the existence of such synergies. Besides testing the overall effectiveness of
our interventions, we were able to study whether gender, age, and employment contract affect an
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individual’s susceptibility to phishing fraud. This information is of great value to policymakers
both within and outside of corporations, as they enable targeted interventions (Kleitman et al.,
2018).
In the experiment, we sent a phishing email to measure the susceptibility of employees to click
on a dubious link and then give away their password. About one third of the subjects clicked on the
link in our control treatment and 22% gave their password. Informing subjects about the risks of
phishing reduced the proportion of subjects clicking on the link by 7 points and the proportion of
password given away by 6 points. A first experience with a phishing email reduced the proportion
of subjects clicking on the link by 9 points and of providing their password by 8 points. Combining
both the information campaign and the experience intervention did not substantially improve the
results with respect to experience alone. Overall, in an organization of the size of the Dutch
Ministry of Economic Affairs, letting all employees experience one phishing email can avoid that
800 passwords are given away.
3.2 Conceptual framework
Several models have been proposed to explain phishing susceptibility. They include individual
factors (personality, perception, knowledge, motivation) and phishing email characteristics (Vish-
wanath et al., 2018; Musuva et al., 2019). The latter cannot be influenced by the (victim) organi-
zation and we therefore focus on the former.
Due to limited attentional resources, people often rely on automatic or heuristic processing
when reading e-mails, increasing the likelihood that people click on links or download malignant
software (Vishwanath et al., 2018). The level of heuristic processing are influenced by cyber-
risk beliefs, which refer to the perception that people have about online threats, and which are
influenced by the degree of experience, efficacy, and knowledge that people have on the subject.
According to the suspicion cognition automaticity model (SCAM) (Vishwanath et al., 2018), sus-
pecting a specific email to be a phishing email is directly and indirectly influenced by general
cyber-risk beliefs, which include risk perception. Higher risk perception obviously makes people
more suspicious about emails but also makes them rely less on heuristic processing and more on
systematic processing when reading emails (Vishwanath et al., 2018). A deeper, more system-
atic processing of the information contained in the emails, including the cues signaling phishing
threats, makes people better able to detect phishing attacks.
Drawing from the field of education science, a simulated experience is argued to be an effec-
tive substitute for learning from an actual experience, especially when simulations provide concrete
and emotionally charged experiences (Zigmont et al., 2011). Similar to an experience of an actual
phishing email, a simulated phishing email may in this way increase risk perception and subse-
quently the level of systematic processing and the degree of suspicion applied to future emails.
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Knowledge, on the other hand, refers to the information the receiver has about the domain of the
threat, the ways to detect it and the required actions (Musuva et al., 2019; Kleitman et al., 2018).
Information provision may increase knowledge about the prevalence of phishing attacks and the
risks these pose. The information can be about how to detect phishing emails and how to deal with
them, which can raise efficacy. Increased knowledge and efficacy together may increase cyber-risk
beliefs and subsequently lower the reliance on heuristic processing.
Many papers recommend to incorporate information and experience of phishing emails into
one training material (Bowen et al., 2011; Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Burns et al., 2013; Sheng
et al., 2007). Crucial is to embed the training in the employees’ natural environment (Xiong et al.,
2019). Arachchilage and Love (2014) found that combining conceptual knowledge and procedural
knowledge is key in enhancing phishing detection and avoidance. A one-time simulated experience
is more likely to affect conceptual knowledge (“know that”) than the procedural knowledge (“know
how”).1 Information provision can target both. Yet, giving information after employees have
received a phishing email can increase the perceived relevance of the information. Information
campaigns about procedures to avoid phishing have indeed been found to have greater impact
after users have fallen for an attack (Alsharnouby et al., 2015). From the literature we therefore
expect both simulated experience and information provision to be effective, but we also expect
their combination to be most effective.
3.3 Method
To test the effectiveness of combining (one-time) experience and information provision on phishing
risks, we conducted a large-scale field experiment. The main characteristics of the experiment are
outlined below, with further details in Appendix 3.A.
3.3.1 Subjects and design
The subjects of this experiment were 10,929 employees of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs,
out of the 12,567 official employees of the Ministry. Reasons for exclusions were mostly technical
(e.g., missing information), or related to the rank at the Ministry (Minister, Secretary General...).
Details are reported in Appendix 3.A. Most subjects were males (60,6%), with an average age of
47 years (Table 2). Subjects learned that they were part of an experiment only after the experiment
was conducted.
We implemented two interventions: information provision (Info) and experience (Exp). We
used a 2x2 design and subjects were divided into four groups of roughly equal size: Control (2723
employees), Info (2740), Exp (2724) and ExpInfo (2742).
1Repeated simulated experience could also improve procedural knowledge if sufficient feedback is provided.
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The experiment was organized around five specific dates T ∈ {1, ..., 5} (see Table 1 for the
exact dates). All four groups received an email that resembled a real phishing email at T = 5.
In the following, we simply refer to this and all other such emails that we sent a simply phishing
email. The first treatment group (Info) received an information email in T = 2, T = 3 and
T = 4 with information about what phishing is and how it works (T = 2), how one can recognize
phishing emails (T = 3), and what one should do when receiving a phishing email (T = 4). The
second treatment group (Exp) was sent a phishing email at time T = 1 and a short debriefing email
explaining that the sent email was fake at the end of the same day. No information was given
that the emails were part of an experiment. The third treatment group (ExpInfo), received both
interventions, thus the phishing email and debriefing email at T = 1 and the information emails at
T = 2, T = 3 and T = 4. One day after the phishing mail at T = 5, all four groups received a
general debriefing. Table 1 below summarizes the experimental timeline and gives the exact dates
of the experiment.
The choice of the timeline followed several constraints. First, to be in line with our concep-
tual framework, experience had to precede information. We would then expect subjects from the
ExpInfo treatment to be more alert about phishing and more receptive to information about it than
those from the Info treatment, who were not exposed to the first phishing experience. Second,
to avoid having one very long email that might discourage readers, the information provided was
split between three emails, which were spread over three weeks. Third, we waited one additional
week after the end of the Info and ExpInfo interventions before sending the final phishing email.
Sending the final phishing email later was not possible because many employees would be on va-
cation (Christmas break). Sending it earlier was undesirable. An email on the same day or a day
later than the Info and ExpInfo interventions might be too easily detectable, inflating the measured
effectiveness of these treatments. A similar one-week delay was used for instance by Xiong et al.
Xiong et al. (2019) to study the effect of training on phishing detection.
A privacy impact assessment was drawn up to identify potential issues concerning privacy and
informed consent. Based on this, the following measures were taken: (1) the analysis was done
on anonymized data, the reporting of the results is only on the basis of aggregated data; (2) prior
to the experiment the general norm of Information Security System Policy compliance was posted
on the intranet; (3) the Employees Council of the Ministry was informed; (4) passwords and other
information given by employees were not recorded; and (5) after the experiment, employees were
debriefed through an extensive email and were provided with contact details of the researchers.
The secretary general and head of internal organization/chief information officer of the ministry
gave their (written) approval of the research.
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Table 1: Experimental timeline
T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5
05/11/2015 19/11/2015 26/11/2015 03/12/2015 15/12/2015
Control
Phishing mail +
debriefing
Info Infographic 1 Infographic 2 Infographic 3
Phishing mail +
debriefing
Exp
Phishing mail +
short debriefing
Phishing mail +
debriefing
ExpInfo
Phishing mail +
short debriefing
Infographic 1 Infographic 2 Infographic 3
Phishing mail +
debriefing
3.3.2 Group formation
We randomized the subjects at the level of the lowest known organizational unit, henceforth re-
ferred to as “basic unit”. In total we had 184 unique basic units, with an average of 61 subjects per
basic unit. We have not opted for randomization at the individual level to avoid contamination of
the results by intervention spillover effects. With randomization at the individual level, it would
have been possible that two subjects working together were divided into different treatment groups.
This could have led some subjects to be affected by more than one treatment.
Table 2 shows the distribution of subjects across the four groups. We ran Kruskall-Wallis tests
to check if the subjects were equally divided between groups in terms of age, age-groups, gender,
employment contract (internal/external), and (the five largest) organizational division (in this paper
we refer to them as A, B, C, D, E). Test results showed no statistically significant differences
between groups in all variables except, as could be expected, for organizational division (Appendix
3.B Table 5). Not all organizational divisions had the same number of basic units (with division
A even having only one basic unit) and the size of the basic units varied substantially. We will
control for divisional differences in our analysis but it is worth noting that our randomization was
successful on all other aspects.
Unfortunately (and out of our control), after the first phishing email at T = 1, an online noti-
fication was posted for the employees in organizational division C, stating that the phishing email
that some employees received was a fake one. Hence the subjects in the Control and Info groups
received this notification as well. This may have affected the results as it created intervention
spillover effects within that division. We would then expect treatments effects to be smaller for
that division. In what follows, we will always report the analysis with and without this division.
Including the division can be expected to give more conservative estimates. Table 3 shows the char-
acteristics of the reduced sample. The distributions of different groups show significant differences
on this sample (see Appendix 3.B Table 5 for Kruskall-Wallis test results).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Group N. of Male Age Internal Organisational divisionsubjects Mean 16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 >55 Employee A B C D E
Control 2723 60.52% 47.45 2.90% 10.54% 26.07% 35.51% 24.97% 80.21% – 14.18% 33.79% 19.32% 32.72%
Info 2740 61.06% 47.35 2.04% 15.26% 25.69% 28.39% 28.61% 79.34% 9.56% 12.23% 19.60% 13.61% 45.00%
Exp 2724 59.99% 47.05 2.86% 13.07% 28.45% 29.22% 26.40% 80.76% – 10.17% 27.09% 25.33% 37.41%
ExpInfo 2742 60.76% 47.31 2.12% 12.65% 26.81% 33.33% 25.09% 80.49% – 12.47% 26.99% 28.05% 32.49%
Whole sample 10929 60.58% 47.29 2.48% 12.88% 26.75% 31.61% 26.27% 80.20% 2.4% 12.26% 26.86% 21.58% 36.91%
Table 3: Descriptive statistics after the exclusion of division C
Group N. of Male Age Internal Organisational divisionsubjects Mean 16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 >55 Employee A B D E
Control 1803 60.68% 47.45 0.94% 11.15% 29.62% 34.33% 23.96% 70.27% – 21.41% 29.17% 49.42%
Info 2203 56.83% 45.69 2.36% 17.43% 28.92% 28.92% 22.38% 74.58% 11.89% 15.21% 16.93% 55.97%
Exp 1986 58.91% 46.14 2.82% 14.20% 31.77% 28.30% 22.91% 74.42% – 13.95% 34.74% 51.31%
ExpInfo 2002 60.24% 46.72 2.35% 13.34% 29.27% 31.72% 23.33% 73.53% – 17.08% 38.41% 44.51%
Reduced sample 7994 59.07% 46.46 2.15% 14.19% 29.87% 30.69% 23.10% 73.30% 3.28% 16.76% 29.50% 50.46%
3.3.3 Procedure
Pre-intervention period (all groups)
We first ensured minimum knowledge about the information security policy of the ministry by
posting a service notice on the intranet of all five organizational divisions of the ministry prior to
the experiment, and visible to all subjects. This message explained the dangers of giving away
personal details. Furthermore, the message stated that the Ministry or a division of the Ministry
would never ask employees for their password, username etc.
T=1: First phishing email: simulating experience and feedback (Groups Exp and ExpInfo
Subjects from the Exp and ExpInfo treatments received an imitation of a real phishing email. The
subject line was: “Economic Affairs – Mobile Password Recovery System”. This email was sent
by the operational management, and subjects were asked to link their account to their mobile phone
number in order to recover their password easily if it was lost, or to change it.
The email contained several characteristics enabling receivers to assess the email as being
fake/fraudulent, presenting more or less the same level of difficulty as phishing emails that were
actually sent at that period. These characteristics were: (1) a misspell in the sender email, (2)
inappropriate use of capital letters in the subject line, (3) a change in the logo and logo color,
(4) an unusual form of salutation for the Ministry, (5) addressing the receiver in the formal form
instead of the informal form, which is normally used, (6) a hyperlink in the email that refers to a
vague website with an extension that would normally not be used within the Ministry (.net) and (7)
two different but resembling fonts in the main text and the disclaimer (Appendix 3.C Figure 3).
We chose an email subject and sender, which we believed to be equally relevant to
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most subjects. The link in the email redirected the subjects to a “fake” website (www.
mobilepasswordrecoverysystem.net). This website had a very basic design and con-
tained a few elements of the governmental visual design style, with some modifications. In order
to link their accounts and phone numbers, subjects were asked to fill in three personal details; (1)
username, (2) password, and (3) phone number. After filling in the details, subjects were redi-
rected to a second screen, thanking them for the registration and stating that the registration would
be completed within five working days. It was not necessary to fill in all the three personal details.
Even if a subject filled in only one field and clicked on “send”, s/he was directed to the second
screen that thanked for his/her registration (Appendix 3.C Figure 4 and 5).
At the end of the day, all subjects from treatments Exp and ExpInfo received a short debriefing
explaining that the email was an “imitation” email designed to increase awareness for phishing
fraud. No information was given that the email was part of an experiment or that there would be
follow-up actions (Appendix 3.C Figure 6). The debriefing email focused on important it was that
all employees contribute to a safer digital environment. By receiving that email, subject could also
learn whether they had made a mistake or not. There was no information about how to recog-
nize phishing, nor about how to react. Subjects from the ExpInfo treatment would receive such
information in the following weeks, as described next.
T=2,3,4: Information Provision – Infographics (Groups Info and ExpInfo)
Subjects in treatments Info and ExpInfo received emails explaining ways to avoid falling for phish-
ing attacks. This information provision occurred in three consecutive weeks, using colorful info-
graphics to maximize the impact of the treatments. The first email explained what phishing is and
how it works, the second how receivers could recognize them, and the third what actions receivers
should undertake when they receive a phishing email (Appendix 3.C Figure 7). The infographics
were designed in a way that (a) makes the subjects understand the risks, (b) keeps the message
simple and short, (c) provides clear actionable items that subjects can easily adopt, and (d) uses
story-based graphics as suggested by Kumaraguru et al., 2007 and Sheng et al., 2007 Kumaraguru
et al. (2007); Sheng et al. (2007).
T=5: Second Phishing email (all groups)
All subjects of the four groups received a (second) phishing email forty days after the subjects in
treatments Exp and ExpInfo had received a phishing email and twelve days after the subjects from
the Info and ExpInfo treatments had received the last infographics. The second phishing email
resembled the first one in terms of looks, length, and recognizable characteristics of phishing
mails. Subjects from the Info and ExpInfo) treatments who would apply the recommendations they
received in the infographics should recognize it as a phishing email.
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This email was sent by the IT department of the Ministry (with a misspelling in the
sender address: helpdesk@dlctu.nl instead of helpdesk@dictu.nl). Subjects were told that
they had reached their maximum storage limit of Outlook and the limit had to be raised via
a hyperlink to www.verhooogjeopslaglimiet.net, which can be translated as www.
increaseyourstoragelimit.net (Appendix 3.C Figure 8). The email asked for an im-
mediate action of the subjects. If they clicked on the link in the email, they were directed to the
website. The website they would reach was again basic, with some visuals of Outlook Exchange,
subjects were told that by filling in e-mail, username and password, limits could be raised up to 8
GB. If the subject indeed filled in the details, a pop-up screen was shown, stating that the regis-
tration was being processed and that it would be completed within five workdays (Appendix 3.C
Figure 9 and 10).
Post-intervention period – Debriefing (all groups)
All subjects received a general debriefing the day after receiving the (second) phishing email. In
this elaborate debriefing the subjects were told that the phishing email(s) and information mails
were part of an experiment. They were given information about; (1) the cause and purpose of the
research, (2) the design of the research, (3) which precautions had been taken in order to respect
the privacy of employees and to protect (personal) details, and (4) where subjects could submit
other questions and/or remarks.
Furthermore, they were informed that the experiment was part of the campaign iBewust-zijn
(Information awareness). With this campaign the Ministry aimed to encourage and support its
employees as much as possible in developing knowledge and awareness regarding information se-
curity. Also, it reassured the employees that the phishing mail was fake, such that no consequences
were attached if subjects indeed had filled in personal details.
3.4 Analysis
Data was collected on whether a subject had clicked on the link and had filled in one or more
personal details, and the time of completion. For privacy concerns, the content of what subjects
had filled in was not registered. The analysis was conducted on 10,929 observations from the
whole sample and on 7,994 observations when division C was excluded.
We measured falling for phishing with three dummy variables: Visit, Fill and Fill|Visit. Visit
indicates whether the subject clicked on the link and visited the website. Irrespective of whether
the subjects filled in personal details, clicking on a link embedded in a phishing email by itself can
be very dangerous since such links may infect computers with malware. Fill takes value 1 if the
subject filled in their password. Although the subjects could also fill in their username or mobile
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phone number/email address, we chose password as the variable of interest since we regard it as the
most confidential data among all.2 However, the results are robust to other variables as well since
99.15% of the subjects who filled in any field did so for all three fields asked. Finally, Fill|Visit
is an indicator variable for whether subjects filled in the password given that they had clicked on
the link (hence excluding subjects who did not visit the website). The average of Fill|Visit can
be interpreted as the probability to fill in the password field conditional on visiting the phishing
website. It informs us whether subjects recognized the phishing fraud only after they visited the
website.
We performed two types of analysis that were chosen to account for cluster randomized tri-
als (the clusters being basic units described in section 2.2). First, we tested the effectiveness of
interventions by weighted t-tests on cluster averages of Visit, Fill and Fill|Visit. For each pair of
treatments, the weighted t-test compared the percentages of subjects falling for phishing email
of all clusters (basic units) of one treatment with those of the other treatment, but weighting the
percentages by the cluster size. Next, we performed logistic regressions on all three variables of
interests with standard errors clustered at basic unit level. We also controlled for treatment group,
gender, employment contract, organizational division and age.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Weighted t-tests
Fig. 1 and 2 display, for the whole and reduced sample respectively, the proportion of subjects
falling for phishing email in each treatment group for each measure, and reports the significance
level of the weighted t-tests. The detailed results of weighted-t tests are given in Appendix 3.B
Table 7. We describe here the results for the whole sample. Treatment effects are larger when
excluding division C. While a third of the subjects in the Control group failed to recognize that
the received mail was a phishing mail and clicked on the link, the proportion of people visiting the
phishing website dropped by 7 to 9 percentage points in the intervention groups.
Among those who visited the link, 68% also filled in their password in the Control group. This
proportion was very similar in Info, being only reduced by 4 points, which was not significant.
By contrast, Fill|Visit was 58% in Exp, and 54% in ExpInfo, both significantly lower than in the
Control group. The difference between Info and ExpInfo was also significant at a 1% level. The
differences between interventions, on the other hand, were not significant with the exception of
Info and ExpInfo in Fig. 1C.
The unconditional frequency of subjects filling in their password, as measured by Fill, was
2There were no subjects who filled in only the password, supporting the idea that people are more reluctant to give
this information away.
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Figure 1: Percentages of subjects falling for phishing email (whole sample)
Stars indicating significance levels for difference of each treatment group compared to the control group with *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 2: Percentages of subjects falling for phishing email (excluding division C)
Stars indicating significance levels for difference of each treatment group compared to the control group with *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
22% in Control, and dropped to 16%, 14%, and 13% in Info, Exp, and ExpInfo respectively. The
effects were stronger after exclusion of Division C. A decrease of 8 percentage points in Fill means
about 200 fewer passwords given away in each of the intervention treatments than in Control.
Implementing these simple interventions for an organization of the size of the ministry can avoid
that 800 passwords are given to hackers.
3.5.2 Regression analysis
The results above gave us a first glimpse on the effect of interventions on tackling phishing fraud.
As explained above, randomization was only done at the level of basic units, and the size of those
varied across organizational divisions. Moreover, as described in section 3.3.2 we found some dif-
ferences between groups in some descriptive statistics when division C was excluded. To account
for these differences, we additionally ran logistic regressions with clustered standard errors, con-
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trolling for descriptive variables and divisions. This second type of analysis also informed us on
the characteristics of the employees who were more prone to click on a dubious link or give away
their password. Table 4 presents the average marginal effects of each independent variable on the
predicted probability of falling for the phishing email estimated on observation values. We discuss
below the effects for the whole sample. The effect sizes were larger after excluding division C
and we only describe them when they lead to different conclusions. As a robustness check we ran
panel logistic regression with random effects using our basic units as panel variable (identifier).
Our results were robust to this specification (see Appendix 3.B Table 8).
Table 4: Logistic regression analysis - Average marginal effects
dy/dx - Whole sample dy/dx - excluding division C
Visit Fill Fill|Visit Visit Fill Fill|Visit
Treatment
Control reference
Info −0.062∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.050 −0.083∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.016) (0.027)
Exp −0.082∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.031) (0.019) (0.012) (0.037)
ExpInfo −0.079∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.030) (0.016) (0.015) (0.034)
Gender
male 0.042∗∗∗ 0.017 −0.041 0.029∗ 0.005 −0.054∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013) (0.027)
Employee contract
Internal Employee 0.025 −0.000 −0.064∗ 0.028 0.006 −0.048
(0.019) (0.012) (0.027) (0.018) (0.012) (0.028)
Age group
16-25 reference
26-35 0.035 0.027 0.073 0.029 0.001 −0.095
(0.027) (0.019) (0.100) (0.029) (0.025) (0.108)
36-45 0.093∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.114 0.072∗ 0.024 −0.097
(0.027) (0.018) (0.090) (0.030) (0.023) (0.085)
46-55 0.147∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.192∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ −0.025
(0.027) (0.017) (0.089) (0.031) (0.024) (0.083)
>55 0.147∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.063
(0.031) (0.022) (0.094) (0.033) (0.028) (0.097)
Division dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10929 10929 2869 7994 7994 1947
Division dummies are added with division B as reference category.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
There is strong evidence that all treatments have a significant negative effect. The probability of
visiting the phishing website decreased by around 6 points in the Info treatment and 8 points with
the other two interventions. The marginal effects of the three interventions were about the same
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when we studied the probability to fill in the password (see column Fill) instead of the probability
to click on the link (column Visit). The probability to fill in a password conditional on visiting the
website was reduced by 10 points in the Exp group and by 15 points in the ExpInfo group. The
effect of Info on Fill|Visit was not significant on the whole sample, but it was when excluding divi-
sion C. We tested the differences between the treatment effects and found no significant difference,
with three exceptions. The effect of Info on Fill|Visit was smaller than that of ExpInfo in the whole
sample and the effects of Info on Fill and on Visit were smaller than those of Exp after excluding
division C (see Appendix 3.B Table 9).
We found some evidence that men were more likely to click on the phishing link but less likely
to fill in their password afterwards once they were on the website. Even if men were not more
likely than women to give away their password overall (no gender effect on Fill), their propensity
to click on phishing links could pose a threat when such links trigger malware download. The
younger age group (16-25) was the least likely to visit the phishing website. Employees between
36 and 45 were 9% more likely to click on the link than the 16-25 age group and those above 46
were almost 15% more likely to click on the link than the youngest group. The effect of age on the
probability to fill in the password conditional on visiting the website were not robust to excluding
division C and we therefore refrain from commenting them.
3.6 Discussion
In our field experiment, we observed a non-negligible proportion of subjects falling into a phishing
attack. An information campaign substantially reduced that risk, and letting subjects experience
a phishing email tended to be at least as effective. Personal experience may have led people to
see threats as more probable, and to view themselves as potential future victims, suggesting that
cyber-risk beliefs were the most serious barrier to phishing detection. Moreover, people may be
more likely to read phishing and/or debriefing emails than information emails. We were not able to
investigate this because we could not check whether subjects opened/read the emails we sent. We
cannot exclude that the experience intervention was effective because it made employees believe
that their employer could know whether they easily give away their password.
It has been argued that information becomes more relevant if it is given after individuals expe-
rience the phishing email. Many suggested that combining the two types of intervention yields the
best results by reinforcing the effect of each other Bowen et al. (2011); Kumaraguru et al. (2007);
Burns et al. (2013); Sheng et al. (2007). Surprisingly, in our experiment, the effectiveness of com-
bining both experience and information did not differ from the effectiveness of experience alone.
A possible explanation was that the experience intervention increased employees’ perceived risk
enough for them to acquire knowledge on their own or activated previously existing knowledge.
Another possible explanation for the absence of synergy is the existence of a ceiling effect. It may
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be difficult to reduce the proportion of password given away much below 10% with simple inter-
ventions as ours. Our results question whether it is worth piling up interventions against phishing
fraud. Each intervention requires sending several emails to users. In organizations in which people
complain about getting too many emails and cognitive overload, one may prefer to focus on the
most effective intervention.
Info and Exp differed in terms of content (infographics versus a phishing email) but also in
terms of dates in which this content was sent. It allowed us to combine both interventions in
Exp but it decreased the comparability between Info and Exp. We should therefore be careful
when comparing the effects of these two treatments. If anything, we would have expected the
Info treatment, with more emails and those being sent closer in time to the final phishing email,
to be more effective than the Exp treatment. This is not what was found. However, it is sound to
compare the effect of infographics on its own with the effect of infographics when combined with
experience. We expected the latter to be larger, but it was not the case.
The Exp treatment involved a first phishing email followed by a debriefing email. We dubbed
the corresponding intervention ‘experience’ but it involved both experience and feedback. Our
feedback was rather limited (see Appendix 3.C Figure 6) and independent of whether people had
visited the phishing website and whether they had given their password. Further research could
vary the degree of feedback and how personalized it is.
We have interpreted filling in the password field as giving away their password but we cannot
know whether they provided their true password or not. What they provided was not saved, for
privacy and safety reasons, and we did not have access to their true password anyhow. It could
be that some people filled in fake information. We should therefore be cautious with this part of
the results. Even if the provided information was not correct, having visited the link already posed
a threat. Visiting fraudulent links makes people susceptible to malware attacks and this behavior
should be eliminated in the first place.
The treatment effects we observed were slightly lower for the analysis on the whole sample
than after excluding division C. In division C, a message was posted online after treatments Exp
and ExpInfo received the first phishing email, thereby affecting the Control and Info groups as
well. If anything, the results on the whole sample give us the lower bound. The effectiveness
of experience could also be studied, but in a less controlled way, by comparing the proportion of
subjects falling for phishing in the first email and the second email in the two treatments in which
two phishing emails were sent. However, this would only be possible if the tests were identical.
About 15% of subjects in Exp and ExpInfo groups clicked on the link in the first email while more
than 20% did so in the second email. The difference can come from the second email being more
difficult to detect than the first one but also from sending the debriefing email earlier after the first
phishing email than after the second. By contrast, comparing the Exp and ExpInfo treatments with
the control as we did in the result section does not suffer from such possible confounds.
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Making people more aware of phishing threats and asking them to report suspicious emails may
backfire in high number of false positives, i.e., employees misjudging genuine emails and reporting
them to the IT department. Kleitman et al. Kleitman et al. (2018) studied which characteristics
influence phishing susceptibility but also false positives. We do not have evidence about false
positives in our experiment. The operations department of the ministry, in charge of information
security, did not report that it was a problem at the time of the study. The official policy was that
people should report any doubtful email, the cost of a false positive being judged much lower than
that of successful phishing. However, this reasoning was based on the experience of the operations
department and their cost-benefit analysis at the time of the experiment. In other instances, anti-
phishing campaigns may create a burden on IT departments and generate other organizational costs
if the rate of false positives upsurges.
3.7 Conclusion
In a field experiment, we studied the effect of experience, information, and their combination
on employees’ reaction to phishing emails. Our information treatment was designed to have a
maximal impact, with infographics and clear messages. We could expect the infographics to be
especially effective after a first (simulated) phishing experience. Each intervention in isolation
had a large effect on the probability to click on a dubious link and to give away personal details.
Combining both interventions did not substantially increase the effect of experience alone, even
though subjects in the experience treatment were only exposed to one experience. Our results
question the opportunity of piling up (costly) interventions.
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Appendix 3.A Additional information about the method
3.A.1 Subjects
The total number of employees in the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs was 12,567. We
excluded those employees with errors/flaws in the dataset, i.e. 40 employees due to their age (age
< 16 & age > 70), 17 due to missing organizational unit information and 408 due to missing
e-mail addresses. Furthermore, we excluded the departments which were covered by a different IT
assistance. Finally, some employees were excluded due to their rank in the organization (Minister,
State Secretary and Secretary General etc.).
3.A.2 Procedure
Pre-intervention
We made arrangements with several parties such as the IT helpdesk and the information se-
curity coordinators in case subjects contacted them during the experiment. We wanted to assure
that none of these parties would inform the subjects that they were part of an experiment, because
this could confound our results. Therefore, we provided them with standardized protocols for
email and phone. This allowed these parties to answer the possible questions of subjects, without
disturbance of the experiment.
Moreover, at the IT helpdesk a dedicated group of employees was formed, who were in first
line of contact with the subjects. Subjects were redirected to this dedicated group through a choice
option at the service line or by automatically forwarding emails to them. When subjects phoned or
emailed them, they were told standardized answers, which were carefully constructed and suited
for each specific question participants could ask. This way, we could; (1) inform/help subjects as
much as possible, without informing them of the experiment, (2) control the outgoing messages.
T = 1
Participants who recognized the mail as being fraudulent and send it to the IT helpdesk (of
the ministry of Economic Affairs), received an answer stating that the mail was indeed a phishing
email, that the threat had receded, and that no further actions on behalf of the user were needed.
If participants mailed the IT helpdesk, without adding the mail, they were still asked to send the
phishing email. This was to establish with certainty that the notification indeed concerned our
‘imitation’ phishing email and not a ‘real-non-experiment-related’ phishing email. Employees
who phoned the IT helpdesk to report the ‘imitation’ phishing email, were first asked the subject
and sender of the email. Furthermore, if it indeed concerned our email, they were asked to send
the email as an attachment in an email to the IT helpdesk. Employees who did not see the email
as suspicious but asked substantive questions regarding the ‘mobile password recovery system’
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were given the answer that they would receive an answer within three workdays (which is standard
protocol for all IT related questions).
T = 2, 3, 4
The first information email starts with a short introduction of the director of operational man-
agement. The introduction states that the received mail is part of an information provision cam-
paign, consisting of three information emails. Furthermore the subjects are given information about
how phishing fraud works and the newer generation of phishing fraud, spear phishing attacks.
The second information mail starts with a short recap of the first information mail. Furthermore
it provides the reader with six points of recognition by which he/she could determine whether
emails are fraudulent or not, such as; (1) the mail address of the sender, (2) the salutation, (3) style
of writing (grammatical or spelling errors), (4) the hyperlink in the mail, (5) look the sender up on
the internet, (6) check the mail address in the signature. Also it lists the types of information that
the ministry never will ask their employees. Finally, it states the three largest consequences (for
organizations) of phishing fraud.
The third information mail starts again with a short recap of the first two information mails.
Furthermore it provides information about, how you should act in the case that (you think that)
you have received a phishing mail and how and where you could report a phishing mail. It con-
cludes with some useful links to other (phishing awareness) campaigns of the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs (www.veiliginternetten.nl and iBewustzijn) where more information could be
found, including some examples of phishing mails.
Moreover the three infographics had some synergetic power, as each of the three infographics
starts with a short recap of the previous mail(s). This ensures the participants that each individual
mail is understandable in itself, without necessity of reading them all. Furthermore, the infograph-
ics; (1) were readable on the mobile phone, laptop and tablet, (2) did not need to be downloaded
first, and (3) were in line with the visual identity style of the Ministry. The story based graph-
ics and annotations, were highly related to the core business activities of the employees and all
images/pictures were copyright free, bought or self-made.
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Appendix 3.B Additional statistics
Table 5: Kruskal-Wallis test results for equality groups formed
Whole sample Excluding div. C
Attribute χ2 p χ2 p
Age 2.479 0.479 28.645 0.000
Age-Group 3.697 0.296 26.179 0.000
Gender 0.508 0.917 5.544 0.136
Employee Contract 0.932 0.818 6.822 0.078
Organisational division 21.256 0.000 15.274 0.002
Table 6: Percentages of subjects falling for phishing email
Whole Sample Excluding div. C
Visit Fill Fill|Visit Visit Fill Fill|Visit
Control 32.21% 21.78% 67.62% 32.39% 22.13% 68.32%
Info 25.58% 16.28% 63.62% 24.06% 14.53% 60.38%
Exp 23.31% 13.58% 58.27% 19.34% 10.67% 55.21%
ExpInfo 23.92% 12.80% 53.51% 22.43% 12.09% 53.90%
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Table 7: Weighted t-test results
(a) Whole sample
Visit
Info Exp ExpInfo
t p t p t p
Control 2.220 0.032 3.723 0.000 3.830 0.000
Info 0.747 0.459 0.579 0.566
Exp -0.273 0.786
Fill
Info Exp ExpInfo
t p t p t p
Control 2.361 0.023 4.328 0.000 5.116 0.000
Info 1.163 0.251 1.577 0.123
Exp 0.450 0.654
Fill|Visit
Info Exp ExpInfo
t p t p t p
Control 1.103 0.276 2.542 0.014 4.176 0.000
Info 1.253 0.216 2.707 0.009
Exp 1.486 0.142
(b) Excluding div. C
Visit
Info Exp ExpInfo
t p t p t p
Control 2.642 0.012 5.159 0.000 3.971 0.000
Info 1.619 0.115 0.563 0.577
Exp -1.404 0.167
Fill
Info Exp ExpInfo
t p t p t p
Control 3.227 0.003 5.781 0.000 4.794 0.000
Info 1.909 0.065 1.145 0.259
Exp -0.829 0.411
Fill|Visit
Info Exp ExpInfo
t p t p t p
Control 1.870 0.070 2.767 0.009 3.618 0.001
Info 0.942 0.352 1.604 0.116
Exp 0.581 0.564
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Table 8: XTLogistic regression analysis - Average marginal effects
dy/dx - All observations dy/dx - excluding NVMA
Visit Fill Fill|Visit Visit Fill Fill|Visit
Treatment
Control omitted
Info −0.079∗ −0.069∗ −0.056 −0.096∗ −0.096∗∗ −0.120∗∗
(0.037) (0.029) (0.041) (0.043) (0.033) (0.043)
Exp −0.088∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.082∗ −0.137∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗
(0.033) (0.026) (0.038) (0.040) (0.031) (0.041)
ExpInfo −0.087∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.025) (0.036) (0.039) (0.030) (0.038)
Gender
male 0.040∗∗∗ 0.015∗ −0.040∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.010 −0.049∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.010) (0.009) (0.024)
Employee contract
Internal Employee 0.005 −0.014 −0.065∗ 0.009 −0.006 −0.046
(0.014) (0.011) (0.030) (0.013) (0.011) (0.030)
Age group
16-25 omitted
26-35 0.022 0.022 0.091 0.031 0.005 −0.089
(0.024) (0.016) (0.085) (0.030) (0.024) (0.110)
36-45 0.082∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.135 0.077∗∗ 0.030 −0.089
(0.024) (0.016) (0.081) (0.030) (0.023) (0.107)
46-55 0.133∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ −0.017
(0.024) (0.017) (0.081) (0.030) (0.024) (0.106)
>55 0.137∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.070
(0.025) (0.018) (0.081) (0.031) (0.025) (0.107)
Division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10929 10929 2869 7994 7994 1947
Division fixed effects are added while base division is B.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: χ2 test for differences of groups in logistic regression
(a) Whole sample
Visit
Exp ExpInfo
χ2 p χ2 p
Info 0.51 0.475 0.47 0.493
Exp 0.02 0.888
Fill
Exp ExpInfo
χ2 p χ2 p
Info 1.08 0.299 2.49 0.115
Exp 0.33 0.565
Fill|Visit
Exp ExpInfo
χ2 p χ2 p
Info 1.92 0.166 7.41 0.007
Exp 1.43 0.232
(b) Excluding div. C
Visit
Exp ExpInfo
χ2 p χ2 p
Info 3.68 0.055 0.54 0.461
Exp 2.07 0.150
Fill
Exp ExpInfo
χ2 p χ2 p
Info 4.87 0.027 1.26 0.262
Exp 0.86 0.354
Fill|Visit
Exp ExpInfo
χ2 p χ2 p
Info 0.52 0.472 1.58 0.209
Exp 0.16 0.693
Appendix 3.C Additional experimental material
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Figure 3: T=1, First phishing email (Translated from Dutch)
 
Sender: BusinessOperations@Mlnez.nl  
Subject: Activate your personal Mobile Password Recovery System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dear Economic Affairs colleague,  
After a successful pilot of the department Business Operations, we recently started 
implementing the EZ - Mobile Password Recovery System (EZ-MPRS) for all EA employees. 
Via this system you can, at all times, retrieve and change your password for your user account. 
With this, we hope to serve you even better and faster.  
Our data shows that you are not yet using the EZ - Mobile Password Recovery System. That 
is why we ask you, to link your account to your mobile number.   
Activate here your EZ – Mobile Password Recovery System (MPRS) 
For more information, see link below: 
https://rijksweb.nl/ezmprs 
Best regards,  
Director Business Operations  
Dit bericht kan informatie bevatten die niet voor u is bestemd. Indien u niet de 
geadresseerde bent of dit bericht abusievelijk aan u is gezonden, wordt u 
verzocht dat aan de afzender te melden en het bericht te verwijderen.  
De Staat aanvaardt geen aansprakelijkheid voor schade, van welke aard ook, 
die verband houdt met risico's verbonden aan het elektronisch verzenden van 
berichten. 
 
This message may contain information that is not intended for you. If you are 
not the addressee or if this message was sent to you by mistake, you are 
requested to inform the sender and delete the message. 
The State accepts no liability for damage of any kind resulting from the risks 
inherent in the electronic transmission of messages. 
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Figure 4: First phishing email linked website (Translated from Dutch)
  
Figure 5: First phishing email Pop-up screen (Translated from Dutch)
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Figure 6: Short debriefing after first phishing mail (Translated from Dutch)
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Figure 7: T = 2, 3, 4, Infographics
(Translated from Dutch and contact details are replaced for privacy concerns)
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Figure 8: T=5, Second phishing email (Translated from Dutch)
Sender:  helpdesk@dlctu.nl 
Subject:  Increase your maximum outlook exchange storage limit.   
 
 
Dear Economic Affairs colleague, 
 
Your mailbox has exceeded the maximum storage limit set by DICTU. You may not send or 
receive e-mail until you have upgraded the maximum limit. To increase your limit, click on the 
link below: 
Increase your storage limit here 
If you do not do this, you run the risk that your mail account will be locked. Thank you for your 
cooperation. 
Best regards,  
For more information, see the link below: 
https://rijksweb.nl/exchangelimiet 
The DICTU Helpdesk 
Dit bericht kan informatie bevatten die niet voor u is bestemd. Indien u niet de geadresseerde 
bent of dit bericht abusievelijk aan u is gezonden, wordt u verzocht dat aan de afzender te melden 
en het bericht te verwijderen. De Staat aanvaardt geen aansprakelijkheid voor schade, van welke 
aard ook, die verband houdt met risicos verbonden aan het elektronisch verzenden van berichten. 
 
This message may contain information that is not intended for you. If you are not the addressee or 
if this message was sent to you by mistake, you are requested to inform the sender and delete the 
message. The State accepts no liability for damage of any kind resulting from the risks inherent in 
the electronic transmission of messages. 
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Figure 9: Second phishing email linked website (Translated from Dutch)
 
Figure 10: Second phishing email Pop-up screen (Translated from Dutch)
 
Conclusion
My PhD dissertation focuses on how people misperceive risk and uncertainty, and how this cogni-
tive bias affects individuals’ preventive actions.
In Chapter 1, we zoom in on very unlikely events in a lab experiment and investigate whether
they are overweighted or neglected. In recent decades there have been many studies on ambiguity
attitudes, however, the focus was on moderate likelihood events and gains. Rare events have been
almost ignored so far because of three main challenges: providing sufficiently high incentives,
disentangling ambiguity attitude from risk attitude and controlling for beliefs. In this study we
address and control for all three challenges. We measure ambiguity attitudes through additivity
indices. With these indices we capture whether a subject assigns the same subjective value to an
event when it is in isolation or combined with other events. If that is the case than the subject is
ambiguity neutral and the event is neither overweighted nor neglected. Any deviation from addi-
tivity gives us non-neutrality in ambiguity. We first use non-parametric tests to examine whether
ambiguity neutrality is violated. The analysis reveals that very unlikely events are not ignored but
rather are overweighted overall, being weighted more strongly in isolation than when part of larger
events. We then use latent profile analysis to study heterogeneity of behavior. With this approach
we classify the subjects into several behavioral profiles which are determined freely by the data
without our intervention. One third behaves close to ambiguity neutrality consistently. The oth-
ers exhibit overweighting of rare events. These results are important since overweighting of rare
events might lead to overinsurance in potential losses and overinvestment in long shots.
Chapter 2, a theoretical contribution, studies how people’s imperfect perception of probabili-
ties can lead to suboptimal prevention efforts. We compare the optimal prevention (self-protection)
level of an agent who does non-linear probability weighting to the optimal prevention level of an-
other agent who has the same utility function but maximizes expected utility. In other words,
we check how much probability weighting of an agent causes him to deviate from his rational
self in his optimal prevention decision. We identify the probability range in which misperceptions
regarding risk and the benefits of preventive actions generate underprevention. We show that a con-
sequence of likelihood insensitivity is not only that agents do not perceive risks they face perfectly
but also the benefits of prevention. This leads agents to put less effort than their rational selves
138 CONCLUSION
would. Our results may provide a novel explanation for the widespread presence of objectively
harmful activities such as smoking and obesity. Policies that aim at promoting better life styles,
therefore, should not only focus on informing people about the risks they face but help them better
assess those risks and how those risks change with prevention.
Chapter 3 analyses an intervention aiming at increasing prevention at the organizational level.
Specifically, in a large field experiment we test the effect of information provision and simulated
experience on reducing the risks of falling into a phishing attack, and thereby increasing cyber-
security. Our experiment was conducted at the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, with more
than 10,000 subjects. The subjects were not aware that they participated in such an experiment
as a result of which we could observe actual behavior in a real life setting. In the experiment, we
sent a phishing email to measure the susceptibility of employees to click on a dubious link and
then give away their password. Prior to this phishing email, subjects were assigned to a specific
treatment group or instead the control group. The information treatment included infographics and
very clear messages. In the experience treatment, employees experienced (simulated) phishing
fraud and were subsequently informed about it, prior to receiving the actual phishing email. Both
approaches substantially reduced the proportion of employees giving away their password in the
actual phishing email. Compared to the control group, being informed about the risks of phishing
reduced the percentage of subjects clicking the link and the percentage of subjects giving away
their passwords by 7 and 6 percentage points, respectively. The reduction in these proportions
were 9 and 8 percentage points for subjects who had a first experience with a phishing email and
got feedback. Combining both interventions did not substantially increase the effect of simulated
experience alone. This shows that doing more is not necessarily better and sometimes just simple
and low cost interventions are effective.
Chapter 4 answers the question of whether sexual context has an impact on ambiguity attitudes
in a lab experiment. Taking Ellsberg urn experiments with monetary outcome as the baseline,
sexual context appears in the source of uncertainty and/or outcome. Sources of uncertainty vary
in within-subject treatments. In one of those treatments instead of betting on the winning color
of balls picked from an urn, the subjects bet on the winning color of condoms picked from an
urn. Therefore, the source remains very similar to the one in baseline treatment but has a sexual
connotation. In the other within-subject treatment sexual context appears in a more natural source
of uncertainty. This time the subjects bet on the proportion of people having sex weekly. Sexual
context in outcome is used in a between-subject treatment where subjects could win condoms
instead of money. The results show that while ambiguity aversion is independent of sexual context
ambiguity generated insensitivity is. Subjects become strongly ambiguity insensitive when sexual
context appears in a natural source, and behave close to neutrality when the outcome is sexual
and source is artificial. This study shows that people are affected from sexual connotations in the
process of decision making even if decisions are not sex related.
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The results in this PhD thesis show that misperceptions of risk and uncertainty in the form of
weighting of likelihoods can explain the coexistence of both overinsurance and underprevention
behavior. Simulated experience and efficient communication of information are proved to be ef-
fective tools for increasing prevention by potentially increasing risk perception in cybersecurity
context. However, the results also show that the strength of weighting is context dependent. Fur-
ther experimental research where subjects deal with situations that resemble real-life insurance and
prevention decisions in different contexts would help in designing intervention methods tailored to
those contexts.

Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift bestudeert fouten die mensen maken bij het inschatten van risico en onzeker-
heid, en hoe deze “cognitieve bias” de preventieve acties van individuen beı¨nvloedt. Hoofdstuk
1 laat in een laboratoriumexperiment zien dat hoe zeldzame gebeurtenissen gepresenteerd worden
van invloed is op hoe mensen die gebeurtenissen waarnemen. Ik laat zien dat mensen zeldzame
gebeurtenissen groter ervaren dan ze in werkelijkheid zijn wanneer die gebeurtenissen afzonder-
lijk aan elkaar worden gepresenteerd in plaats van gezamelijk. Hoofdstuk 2 laat theoretisch zien
dat dit verklaard kan worden aan de hand van kansweging, hetzelfde fenomeen dat er ook voor
zorgt dat mensen tegelijkertijd oververzekerd zijn en weinig preventieve handelingen uitvoeren.
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert een interventie in cybersecurity gericht op het vergroten van preventie op
organisatieniveau in een veldexperiment. In het experiment test ik of enerzijds het effectiever
communiceren van informatie naar werknemers, of anderzijds een gesimuleerde phishing-aanval,
helpt om phishing-aanvallen te voorkomen. Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de kwestie dat de risicoinschat-
ting van mensen kan verschillen met de context. Een laboratoriumexperiment toont aan dat een
seksuele context invloed heeft op de ambiguı¨teit van attitudes.
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